Grant: Industrial Research Chairs
Concordia University
$175,000.00
NSERC/Hydro-Québec/Thales Industrial Research Chair in Smart Grid Security: Detection, Prevention, Mitigation and Recovery from Cyber-Physical Attacks
FY 2018-19
Summary
The current electric grid is considered as one of the best engineering achievements of the twentieth century. It*was designed to deliver power to various consumer domains. To a large extent, it has been successful in*fulfilling this objective. Nevertheless, the electric grid has experienced several blackouts over the past years. In*particular, there have been five major blackouts over the past forty years, three of which have occurred in the*past nine years alone. The aspiration to secure power, to achieve energy efficiency and to contribute to*environment protection through the increasing utilization of renewable energies are driving the need to deploy*smart grids. It is predicated that these smart grids will allow for bidirectional power flow as well as new ways*to manage both power generation and the increasing energy demand. The successful deployment of smart grids*is predicated on the ability to guarantee their security. Such a requirement is of paramount importance since*electrical grids are essential to several components of the critical infrastructure. Recent cyber security incidents*and security research studies demonstrate that electrical grids could be subjected to disrupting attacks that*might lead to severe security and economic consequences, and even to the endangerment and loss of human*lives. Furthermore, the increasing integration of ICT technologies will definitely augment cyber attack*surfaces. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities might lead to attacks that will, for instance, skew the state*information, alter the abilities to locate events or faults on transmission lines, place the grid at operating points*that are at greater risk from contingencies. This will lead to undesirable and severe consequences such as*financial losses, systemic losses from cascading failures, major blackouts, etc. The primary intent of this*research is to explore the security of smart grid domains, components, devices and protocols to: (1) elicit the*security requirements; (2) identify the attack surfaces together with the underlying vulnerabilities, threats and*their cyber physical consequences; (3) propose practical and efficient detection, prevention, mitigation and*recovery techniques and methodologies that will definitely harden and enhance the overall smart grid security.
Program
Industrial Research Chairs
Recipient
Location
Quebec, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
501621-2015
Name nom
Debbabi, Mourad
Department département
Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering (CIISE)
Organization id
70
Institution établissement
Concordia University
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2018
Competition year année de concours
2015
Award amount
175000
Program id
IRCPJ
Program name en
Industrial Research Chairs
Program name fr
Professeurs-chercheurs industriels
Group en
Research partnerships programs
Group fr
Programmes de partenariat
Committee code
141
Committee name en
University/Industry
Committee name fr
Universités/industrie
Area of application code
304
Area of application group en
Energy resources
Area of application group fr
Ressources d'énergie
Area of application en
Electrical energy
Area of application fr
Énergie électrique
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
3
Nb partie
3
Application title
NSERC/Hydro-Québec/Thales Industrial Research Chair in Smart Grid Security: Detection, Prevention, Mitigation and Recovery from Cyber-Physical Attacks
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The current electric grid is considered as one of the best engineering achievements of the twentieth century. It*was designed to deliver power to various consumer domains. To a large extent, it has been successful in*fulfilling this objective. Nevertheless, the electric grid has experienced several blackouts over the past years. In*particular, there have been five major blackouts over the past forty years, three of which have occurred in the*past nine years alone. The aspiration to secure power, to achieve energy efficiency and to contribute to*environment protection through the increasing utilization of renewable energies are driving the need to deploy*smart grids. It is predicated that these smart grids will allow for bidirectional power flow as well as new ways*to manage both power generation and the increasing energy demand. The successful deployment of smart grids*is predicated on the ability to guarantee their security. Such a requirement is of paramount importance since*electrical grids are essential to several components of the critical infrastructure. Recent cyber security incidents*and security research studies demonstrate that electrical grids could be subjected to disrupting attacks that*might lead to severe security and economic consequences, and even to the endangerment and loss of human*lives. Furthermore, the increasing integration of ICT technologies will definitely augment cyber attack*surfaces. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities might lead to attacks that will, for instance, skew the state*information, alter the abilities to locate events or faults on transmission lines, place the grid at operating points*that are at greater risk from contingencies. This will lead to undesirable and severe consequences such as*financial losses, systemic losses from cascading failures, major blackouts, etc. The primary intent of this*research is to explore the security of smart grid domains, components, devices and protocols to: (1) elicit the*security requirements; (2) identify the attack surfaces together with the underlying vulnerabilities, threats and*their cyber physical consequences; (3) propose practical and efficient detection, prevention, mitigation and*recovery techniques and methodologies that will definitely harden and enhance the overall smart grid security.