Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Lakehead University
$23,500.00
Modeling risk-sharing contracts
FY 2015-16
Summary
With healthcare spending being the largest segment of the economy, largely driven by prescription drug expenditures, my research program will identify how these costs can be controlled while improving the health outcomes of consumers.
This research is motivated by observing a novel type of contract applied in the pharmaceutical industry. ""Risk-sharing"" contracts have been proposed in various forms in countries including Canada, England, Australia and New Zealand. However, little research has theoretically investigated how such a contract is designed. This research applies methods in economics, operations research and mathematics to explore the theoretical basis of different contracts in the pharmaceutical market and to provide managerial insights regarding the management of contracts.
I will consider two main contract forms: cost-oriented and outcome-oriented contracts. The former is used when the cost of a drug or its demand is uncertain while the latter is used when a drug's health benefit is uncertain. The contract specifies a threshold for the sales volume or health outcome of a drug. I will develop a series of mathematical models to investigate how optimal decisions are made when a drug payer, such as government-run insurance plans and insurance companies, and a manufacturer (or several manufacturers) negotiate a contract under various situations.
Now that drug expenditures are the fastest growing segment of healthcare costs in many countries, risk-sharing contracts are important to drug payers to control costs. As well, they are vital to improve patient health and for drug manufacturers in negotiating favourable contract terms. Very few papers have theoretically investigated the application of risk-sharing contracts to the real world. This research will contribute to the literature on supply chain management as a novel approach in health-care sectors and for contracting problem literature on the development of new techniques to solve such issues.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
386511-2011
Name nom
Zhang, Hui
Department département
Business Administration, Faculty of
Organization id
25
Institution établissement
Lakehead University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
23500
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1509
Committee name en
Civil, Industrial and Systems Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie civil, industriel et des systèmes
Area of application code
520
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Production and operations management
Area of application fr
Production et gestion des opérations
Research subject code
1601
Research subject group en
Industrial engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie industriel
Research subject en
Operations research and management science
Research subject fr
Recherche opérationnelle et science de la gestion
Partie
5
Nb partie
5
Application title
Modeling risk-sharing contracts
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
With healthcare spending being the largest segment of the economy, largely driven by prescription drug expenditures, my research program will identify how these costs can be controlled while improving the health outcomes of consumers.
This research is motivated by observing a novel type of contract applied in the pharmaceutical industry. ""Risk-sharing"" contracts have been proposed in various forms in countries including Canada, England, Australia and New Zealand. However, little research has theoretically investigated how such a contract is designed. This research applies methods in economics, operations research and mathematics to explore the theoretical basis of different contracts in the pharmaceutical market and to provide managerial insights regarding the management of contracts.
I will consider two main contract forms: cost-oriented and outcome-oriented contracts. The former is used when the cost of a drug or its demand is uncertain while the latter is used when a drug's health benefit is uncertain. The contract specifies a threshold for the sales volume or health outcome of a drug. I will develop a series of mathematical models to investigate how optimal decisions are made when a drug payer, such as government-run insurance plans and insurance companies, and a manufacturer (or several manufacturers) negotiate a contract under various situations.
Now that drug expenditures are the fastest growing segment of healthcare costs in many countries, risk-sharing contracts are important to drug payers to control costs. As well, they are vital to improve patient health and for drug manufacturers in negotiating favourable contract terms. Very few papers have theoretically investigated the application of risk-sharing contracts to the real world. This research will contribute to the literature on supply chain management as a novel approach in health-care sectors and for contracting problem literature on the development of new techniques to solve such issues.