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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

Carleton University

$29,000.00

From Trusted Computing to Trustworthy Execution

FY 2021-22

Summary
When a computer user accesses a remote service involving sensitive information, ensuring that the service program has executed with integrity and confidentiality is important before the service outcome can be trusted. For this purpose, trusted computing (TC) is introduced, which performs certain cryptographic measurements for inital integrity and isolates the program from outside for integrity and confidentiality. To eventually provide evidence of such protection to the user, a mechanism called attestation signs the measurements with a long-term secret that never gets exposed elsewhere and sends them to the user. The user chooses to trust the execution, seeing the measurements come from the long-term secret (verified with the public part of that secret) and cryptographically match the intended program. Nonetheless, current TC is still sub-ideal to be considered trustworthy. Things can go wrong in the following ways (examples): 1) the long-term secret can be learned by an adversary from intrinsic side channels, i.e., even when hardware never exposes the secret as the computer architecture specifies, the unspecified (mostly timing) behavior still leaks the secret. 2) with guaranteed initial integrity, a program's execution dynamics can largely be affected by data exchange with the outside, even if the program itself is isolated. Such dynamics include control/data flow and memory access safety. Therefore, the execution can deviate from what was originally measured. 3) the attestation request can be relayed to and fulfilled by a computer possessing the correct long-term secret, but different from where the program has actually run. I propose to advance TC to be closer to trustworthiness, embodied mainly by architectural discretization of secure elements and execution binding. The secure element (SE) is a hardware component where the long-term secrets are stored and protected. Compared to merely physical discreteness, the proposed architectural discretization makes sure that secrets in the SE never get exposed to the rich processor environment (never leaving the SE), and the involved operations are not visible to any system software and firmware. The discrete SE is designed with minimal complexity. This way, the aforementioned side channels are no longer applicable, due to no resource sharing. Execution binding (as opposed to platform binding to avoid attestation relay) is to include the execution dynamics into attestation so that correct attestation result can reflect (to a larger extent) correct execution. Such an SE design also allows the trust to be user-oriented, e.g., open provisioning and multi-purpose/multi-user SE.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
RGPIN-2020-04734
Name nom
Zhao, Lianying
Department département
School of Computer Science
Organization id
23
Institution établissement
Carleton University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2021
Competition year année de concours
2020
Award amount
29000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
802
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Information systems and technology
Area of application fr
Systèmes d'information et technologie de l'information
Research subject code
2719
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer architecture and design
Research subject fr
Architecture d'ordinateur et conception
Installment
inst:2
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
From Trusted Computing to Trustworthy Execution
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
When a computer user accesses a remote service involving sensitive information, ensuring that the service program has executed with integrity and confidentiality is important before the service outcome can be trusted. For this purpose, trusted computing (TC) is introduced, which performs certain cryptographic measurements for inital integrity and isolates the program from outside for integrity and confidentiality. To eventually provide evidence of such protection to the user, a mechanism called attestation signs the measurements with a long-term secret that never gets exposed elsewhere and sends them to the user. The user chooses to trust the execution, seeing the measurements come from the long-term secret (verified with the public part of that secret) and cryptographically match the intended program. Nonetheless, current TC is still sub-ideal to be considered trustworthy. Things can go wrong in the following ways (examples): 1) the long-term secret can be learned by an adversary from intrinsic side channels, i.e., even when hardware never exposes the secret as the computer architecture specifies, the unspecified (mostly timing) behavior still leaks the secret. 2) with guaranteed initial integrity, a program's execution dynamics can largely be affected by data exchange with the outside, even if the program itself is isolated. Such dynamics include control/data flow and memory access safety. Therefore, the execution can deviate from what was originally measured. 3) the attestation request can be relayed to and fulfilled by a computer possessing the correct long-term secret, but different from where the program has actually run. I propose to advance TC to be closer to trustworthiness, embodied mainly by architectural discretization of secure elements and execution binding. The secure element (SE) is a hardware component where the long-term secrets are stored and protected. Compared to merely physical discreteness, the proposed architectural discretization makes sure that secrets in the SE never get exposed to the rich processor environment (never leaving the SE), and the involved operations are not visible to any system software and firmware. The discrete SE is designed with minimal complexity. This way, the aforementioned side channels are no longer applicable, due to no resource sharing. Execution binding (as opposed to platform binding to avoid attestation relay) is to include the execution dynamics into attestation so that correct attestation result can reflect (to a larger extent) correct execution. Such an SE design also allows the trust to be user-oriented, e.g., open provisioning and multi-purpose/multi-user SE.