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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of British Columbia

$29,000.00

A developmental-cognitive approach to understanding other minds

FY 2015-16

Summary
Humans exist in a world of agents, who, unlike physical objects that are governed by observable and rule-like properties, are motivated by unseen mental states such as intentions, desires, and beliefs. Determining the content of others' mental states represents a complex cognitive problem: in addition to being unobservable, mental states are unique to particular individuals, and may vary widely within an individual across time and context. While an individual's behavior serves as a cue to his or her underlying mental states, the relationship between behavior and mental content is imperfect at best: one and the same mental state may inspire multiple behaviors, and a particular behavior may be motivated by many different mental states, or, in the case of accidents, no mental states at all. Adding to the complexity of the problem are what might be considered valenced mental states, or the intention to bring about positive and negative outcomes, perhaps regarding another individual who, in turn, possesses their own set of unobservable, complex, and potentially valenced mental contents. Yet, despite all of these subtleties, human adults appear to have no trouble inferring others' mental states from brief observations of behavior, and such content is pervasive in their reasoning about and memory for these behaviors. The ease at which adults succeed in these tasks is not trivial: failure to accurately represent another's mental states may have direct negative implications for survival. The principle objective of the research proposed herein is to examine how we understand others' actions by an analysis of the mental states that drive them. It asks, by studying preverbal infants, whether the cognitive abilities required therein are present in our earliest understandings of the social world, or rather are developed over time through extensive experience and teaching. Specifically, the proposed research consists of a systematic comparison of the relative influence of action outcome versus actor intention in a variety of well-known cases in which these dimensions differ: failed attempts to help and harm, accidental helping and harming, helping and harming by coersion, and helping and harming by omission. This work will yield benefits to research programs that examine our basic social-cognitive abilities, helping to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms by which we understand the minds of others.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
British Columbia, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
402356-2011
Name nom
Hamlin, Kiley
Department département
Psychology
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
29000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1210
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Psychology
Area of application fr
Psychologie
Research subject code
6305
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Cognitive science -- development
Research subject fr
Science cognitive -- développement
Partie
5
Nb partie
5
Application title
A developmental-cognitive approach to understanding other minds
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Humans exist in a world of agents, who, unlike physical objects that are governed by observable and rule-like properties, are motivated by unseen mental states such as intentions, desires, and beliefs. Determining the content of others' mental states represents a complex cognitive problem: in addition to being unobservable, mental states are unique to particular individuals, and may vary widely within an individual across time and context. While an individual's behavior serves as a cue to his or her underlying mental states, the relationship between behavior and mental content is imperfect at best: one and the same mental state may inspire multiple behaviors, and a particular behavior may be motivated by many different mental states, or, in the case of accidents, no mental states at all. Adding to the complexity of the problem are what might be considered valenced mental states, or the intention to bring about positive and negative outcomes, perhaps regarding another individual who, in turn, possesses their own set of unobservable, complex, and potentially valenced mental contents. Yet, despite all of these subtleties, human adults appear to have no trouble inferring others' mental states from brief observations of behavior, and such content is pervasive in their reasoning about and memory for these behaviors. The ease at which adults succeed in these tasks is not trivial: failure to accurately represent another's mental states may have direct negative implications for survival. The principle objective of the research proposed herein is to examine how we understand others' actions by an analysis of the mental states that drive them. It asks, by studying preverbal infants, whether the cognitive abilities required therein are present in our earliest understandings of the social world, or rather are developed over time through extensive experience and teaching. Specifically, the proposed research consists of a systematic comparison of the relative influence of action outcome versus actor intention in a variety of well-known cases in which these dimensions differ: failed attempts to help and harm, accidental helping and harming, helping and harming by coersion, and helping and harming by omission. This work will yield benefits to research programs that examine our basic social-cognitive abilities, helping to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms by which we understand the minds of others.