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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Toronto

$26,000.00

Mean Field Games, Information Design and Evolutionary Finance

FY 2023-24

Summary
Mean field games (MFGs) provide a useful approximation for large population stochastic games in which the players are coupled through their empirical distribution. Many financial and economic models that were once intractable due to high dimensionality can now be analyzed using the MFG approach. Part of the research proposal studies two MFG problems arisen in mathematical finance and economics. The first one is a continuation of the principal investigator's previous work on rank-based games and optimal reward design, where we propose to look at a multi-stage mean field competition with a reward stream that depends on the ranking of the completion time of each stage or the running rank of the progress process. The model applies to situations where many firms or individuals compete to be the first to achieve a goal with multiple milestones. The second one is a MFG of optimal stopping where the interaction among players is neither through the state process nor the cost structure, at least not in a direct way, but through the belief or information revealed from the action of stopping. The optimal stopping problems proposed include the quickest detection of the occurrence of a financial event and the sequential testing of the value of an unknown market variable. By specifying how each agent process the public information, one may be able to analyze the effect of conformity to the public opinion on people's decision making, and whether it benefits people individually as well as collectively. The proposal also contains two new lines of research. One is concerned with stochastic control and games where the control variable is the information, modelled by sigma-algebras, and the performance criteria involves the conditional expectation of a random variable given that information. Such a problem is known as Bayesian persuasion or information design which has seen a variety of applications in finance, politic science, law enforcement, medical testing and so on. Our goal is to develop the mathematical theory and numerical algorithm for both static and dynamic information design problems, possibly with information constraints, and static information games. The other line of research incorporates biological models of evolution and learning based on the principle of selection and mutation into the financial market. Both topics bring interesting problems and ideas from other fields such as economics and biology to the stochastic control and mathematical finance communities, which will open doors for new theories and applications.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
RGPIN-2020-06290
Name nom
Zhang, Yuchong
Department département
Statistical Sciences
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2023
Competition year année de concours
2020
Award amount
26000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1508
Committee name en
Mathematics and Statistics
Committee name fr
Mathématiques et statistique
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
3006
Research subject group en
Statistics and probability
Research subject group fr
Probability theory
Research subject en
Statistique et probabilité
Research subject fr
Théorie de la probabilité
Application title
Mean Field Games, Information Design and Evolutionary Finance
Keyword
Equilibrium; Evolutionary finance; Information design; Learning; Mean field games; Mechanism design; Optimal stopping; Rank-based rewards
Application summary
Mean field games (MFGs) provide a useful approximation for large population stochastic games in which the players are coupled through their empirical distribution. Many financial and economic models that were once intractable due to high dimensionality can now be analyzed using the MFG approach. Part of the research proposal studies two MFG problems arisen in mathematical finance and economics. The first one is a continuation of the principal investigator's previous work on rank-based games and optimal reward design, where we propose to look at a multi-stage mean field competition with a reward stream that depends on the ranking of the completion time of each stage or the running rank of the progress process. The model applies to situations where many firms or individuals compete to be the first to achieve a goal with multiple milestones. The second one is a MFG of optimal stopping where the interaction among players is neither through the state process nor the cost structure, at least not in a direct way, but through the belief or information revealed from the action of stopping. The optimal stopping problems proposed include the quickest detection of the occurrence of a financial event and the sequential testing of the value of an unknown market variable. By specifying how each agent process the public information, one may be able to analyze the effect of conformity to the public opinion on people's decision making, and whether it benefits people individually as well as collectively. The proposal also contains two new lines of research. One is concerned with stochastic control and games where the control variable is the information, modelled by sigma-algebras, and the performance criteria involves the conditional expectation of a random variable given that information. Such a problem is known as Bayesian persuasion or information design which has seen a variety of applications in finance, politic science, law enforcement, medical testing and so on. Our goal is to develop the mathematical theory and numerical algorithm for both static and dynamic information design problems, possibly with information constraints, and static information games. The other line of research incorporates biological models of evolution and learning based on the principle of selection and mutation into the financial market. Both topics bring interesting problems and ideas from other fields such as economics and biology to the stochastic control and mathematical finance communities, which will open doors for new theories and applications.