Grant: Collaborative Research and Development Grants
University of Toronto
$70,000.00
The market power of network coding
FY 2009-10
Summary
With the recent advances of network coding, data streams are divided into multiple segments, and each
segment is further divided into a number of blocks, which are then coded and transmitted over large-scale
networks. Since network coding is used, all coded blocks that belong to the same segment are equally useful,
creating a large quantity of the same "commodity" in the network. The more coded blocks that become
available in the network, the easier it is for a receiving node to reconstruct the segment. This improves the
degree of robustness in the network: one just needs to receive a sufficient number of coded blocks in a
segment, without noting its source.
This project explores the fundamental economic benefits of network coding with respect to its "market power"
of equalizing the prices of data blocks. If network coding is not used, each sender, as a "seller" of data blocks
in the market, may have some "rare" blocks and some more common blocks that overlap with other sellers, and
"rarer" blocks demand higher prices. With the help of network coding, blocks within the same segment are
equally useful and command the same price, and as such it is less likely for "rare" blocks to exist. Such rare
blocks are detrimental to the efficiency of content distribution and streaming in both wireless and peer-to-peer
networks, as nodes that have not yet received them need to wait till they become more widely available. In this
project, we seek to quantitatively study the market power of network coding on how it may equalize pricing of
data blocks as commodities in the market, and improve the efficiency of large-scale data distribution. We
consider the scenarios of both wireless and peer-to-peer overlay networks, and use tools from market theory
and game theory to facilitate our analysis. We seek to establish and support the claim that the most
fundamental benefit of network coding resides in its market power in large-scale networks.
Program
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
379623-2008
Name nom
Li, Baochun
Department département
Electrical and Computer Engineering, Edward S. Rogers Sr. Department of
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2009
Competition year année de concours
2008
Award amount
70000
Program id
CRDPJ
Program nane en
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Program name fr
Subventions de recherche et développement coopérative
Group en
Research partnerships programs
Group fr
Programmes de partenariat
Committee code
96
Committee name en
RPP Internal Decision Cttee
Committee name fr
Cté de décision interne - PPR
Area of application code
803
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer communications
Area of application fr
Téléinformatique
Research subject code
2508
Research subject group en
Electrical and electronic engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie électrique et électronique
Research subject en
Communications networks
Research subject fr
Réseaux de télécommunications
Partie
1
Nb partie
1
Application title
The market power of network coding
Keyword
NA
Application summary
With the recent advances of network coding, data streams are divided into multiple segments, and each
segment is further divided into a number of blocks, which are then coded and transmitted over large-scale
networks. Since network coding is used, all coded blocks that belong to the same segment are equally useful,
creating a large quantity of the same "commodity" in the network. The more coded blocks that become
available in the network, the easier it is for a receiving node to reconstruct the segment. This improves the
degree of robustness in the network: one just needs to receive a sufficient number of coded blocks in a
segment, without noting its source.
This project explores the fundamental economic benefits of network coding with respect to its "market power"
of equalizing the prices of data blocks. If network coding is not used, each sender, as a "seller" of data blocks
in the market, may have some "rare" blocks and some more common blocks that overlap with other sellers, and
"rarer" blocks demand higher prices. With the help of network coding, blocks within the same segment are
equally useful and command the same price, and as such it is less likely for "rare" blocks to exist. Such rare
blocks are detrimental to the efficiency of content distribution and streaming in both wireless and peer-to-peer
networks, as nodes that have not yet received them need to wait till they become more widely available. In this
project, we seek to quantitatively study the market power of network coding on how it may equalize pricing of
data blocks as commodities in the market, and improve the efficiency of large-scale data distribution. We
consider the scenarios of both wireless and peer-to-peer overlay networks, and use tools from market theory
and game theory to facilitate our analysis. We seek to establish and support the claim that the most
fundamental benefit of network coding resides in its market power in large-scale networks.