Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
McGill University
$20,000.00
Mechanism Design for a Sustainable Supply Chain Management
FY 2015-16
Summary
Supply chain management (SCM) lies at the core of globalization forces that flattened the world over the last decade. That being said, siloed approach to managing supply chain systems that drive economic development and growth has led us down a dangerous path toward unsustainable prosperity. This problem is especially exacerbated due to the increasing degrees of information asymmetry, demand and supply risks and agency costs, all of which prevent the supply chains from reaching to their full potentials. Due to the emergence of complex problems such as climate change, and overexploitation of natural resources, we are on the verge of creating a society ill-suited to the needs and limits of both natural resources and environment. To summarize, current contracts, policies and mechanisms fail to provide a balanced perspective necessary for a sustainable SCM, which can no longer be ruled by a single objective and single mechanism-designer but by multiple objectives and complex interactions among multiple mechanism designers. Hence, in this research program, we intend to develop and analyze a framework that considers a supply chain as a nexus of contracts designed by multiple stakeholders, be they suppliers and retailers who put more emphasis on cost minimization or profit maximization and regulators, government agencies and NGOs which put more emphasis on operational sustainability and ensure the compliance of the internal supply chain members to the environmental considerations.
This research proposal is for a 5-year integrative program for modeling and developing multi-lateral mechanisms so as to guide future policy and investments in these systems with the goal of attaining sustainable prosperity. Building upon the applicant's current work in SCM in the presence of asymmetric information combined with recent developments in the theory of incentives with multi-principal and multi-agent systems, the program examines the full path from sustainability to information and risk management in supply chains.
The objectives of the research program are, in the short term:
- To develop a multi-principal multi-agent framework for a sustainable SCM, where the principals (e.g., regulators, buyers and suppliers, etc.) may have conflicting design objectives for the ultimate supply chain system and where the agents (e.g., upstream and downstream firms) have varying cost, risk and informational characteristics,
- To design efficient and optimal mechanisms that are implementable, i.e., that would take into account both profit-maximization (or cost-minimization) incentives of internal supply chain actors and sustainability objectives of external players,
and in the long term:
- To develop computationally tractable mechanisms by focusing on a combination of structured supply chain contracts (e.g., risk-, revenue- and cost-sharing incentives) and regulatory mechanisms (e.g., audit- and market-based incentives) and analyze their structural properties and performances in terms of efficiency and optimality,
- Finally, to evaluate the agency costs for the supply chains plagued with asymmetric information and to explore the role of information-sharing in achieving efficiency and and/or optimality.
Supply chain systems are the lifeblood of the economy and those innovations that are transforming them are here to stay in the near future. Success in sustainably harnessing the potential of these systems so as to serve the society most effectively would require a holistic approach that takes into account interdependencies between the various internal as well as external actors. This research will be among the first to develop such an integrated framework to help researchers analyze the contract design problem for a sustainable SCM.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Quebec, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
RGPIN-2014-04626
Name nom
Gumus, Mehmet
Department département
Management, Desautels Faculty of
Organization id
61
Institution établissement
McGill University
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2014
Award amount
20000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1509
Committee name en
Civil, Industrial and Systems Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie civil, industriel et des systèmes
Area of application code
500
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Research subject code
1606
Research subject group en
Industrial engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie industriel
Research subject en
Operations management
Research subject fr
Gestion de la production
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Mechanism Design for a Sustainable Supply Chain Management
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Supply chain management (SCM) lies at the core of globalization forces that flattened the world over the last decade. That being said, siloed approach to managing supply chain systems that drive economic development and growth has led us down a dangerous path toward unsustainable prosperity. This problem is especially exacerbated due to the increasing degrees of information asymmetry, demand and supply risks and agency costs, all of which prevent the supply chains from reaching to their full potentials. Due to the emergence of complex problems such as climate change, and overexploitation of natural resources, we are on the verge of creating a society ill-suited to the needs and limits of both natural resources and environment. To summarize, current contracts, policies and mechanisms fail to provide a balanced perspective necessary for a sustainable SCM, which can no longer be ruled by a single objective and single mechanism-designer but by multiple objectives and complex interactions among multiple mechanism designers. Hence, in this research program, we intend to develop and analyze a framework that considers a supply chain as a nexus of contracts designed by multiple stakeholders, be they suppliers and retailers who put more emphasis on cost minimization or profit maximization and regulators, government agencies and NGOs which put more emphasis on operational sustainability and ensure the compliance of the internal supply chain members to the environmental considerations.
This research proposal is for a 5-year integrative program for modeling and developing multi-lateral mechanisms so as to guide future policy and investments in these systems with the goal of attaining sustainable prosperity. Building upon the applicant's current work in SCM in the presence of asymmetric information combined with recent developments in the theory of incentives with multi-principal and multi-agent systems, the program examines the full path from sustainability to information and risk management in supply chains.
The objectives of the research program are, in the short term:
- To develop a multi-principal multi-agent framework for a sustainable SCM, where the principals (e.g., regulators, buyers and suppliers, etc.) may have conflicting design objectives for the ultimate supply chain system and where the agents (e.g., upstream and downstream firms) have varying cost, risk and informational characteristics,
- To design efficient and optimal mechanisms that are implementable, i.e., that would take into account both profit-maximization (or cost-minimization) incentives of internal supply chain actors and sustainability objectives of external players,
and in the long term:
- To develop computationally tractable mechanisms by focusing on a combination of structured supply chain contracts (e.g., risk-, revenue- and cost-sharing incentives) and regulatory mechanisms (e.g., audit- and market-based incentives) and analyze their structural properties and performances in terms of efficiency and optimality,
- Finally, to evaluate the agency costs for the supply chains plagued with asymmetric information and to explore the role of information-sharing in achieving efficiency and and/or optimality.
Supply chain systems are the lifeblood of the economy and those innovations that are transforming them are here to stay in the near future. Success in sustainably harnessing the potential of these systems so as to serve the society most effectively would require a holistic approach that takes into account interdependencies between the various internal as well as external actors. This research will be among the first to develop such an integrated framework to help researchers analyze the contract design problem for a sustainable SCM.