Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of Windsor
$27,000.00
""Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation""
FY 2015-16
Summary
Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
327570-2012
Name nom
Scoboria, Alan
Department département
Psychology
Organization id
37
Institution établissement
University of Windsor
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2012
Award amount
27000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1210
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Psychology
Area of application fr
Psychologie
Research subject code
6304
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Cognitive science -- fundamental
Research subject fr
Science cognitive -- principes fondamentaux
Partie
4
Nb partie
5
Application title
""Dissociating belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall within autobiographical memory: Conceptual refinement and experimental manipulation""
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Much of the time, recollecting events and believing that events occurred in the past happen together. Memories are typically believed, and the study of autobiographical recollection is often the study of believed memories. Yet recent work shows that autobiographical belief can occur without recollection. Work on false memories and non-remembered autobiographical events shows that autobiographical beliefs frequently occur in the absence of memory. Research on non-believed memories, memories that were formerly but are no longer believed, shows that recollection can also exceed belief. Other theory and research shows that recollection and belief in the accuracy of recall (via confidence) are also conceptually distinct. However, belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recall have yet to be theoretically and empirically distinguished simultaneously. This research program will, 1) test structural models in which belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in recollection are theorized to represent distinct latent variables, using appropriate event cueing methods that are developed; 2) experimentally create and manipulate non-believed memories in the laboratory; and 3) conduct the first exploratory neuroimaging study of the distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection. Cumulatively, these studies will establish the degree to which distinguishing belief in occurrence, recollection, and confidence in reollection challenges previous conceptualizations of the structure and function of autobiographical memory. Dissociations between processes such as those under investigation may lead to revisions of theories about exactly what is being reported when people indicated that they are remembering. Should the proposed dissociations emerge through this research, established approaches to memory may require revision in order to accommodate the distinction between evaluations of the truth of event occurrence versus the presence of memory-like mental simulations that may or may not indiate events happened in the past.