Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Carleton University
$32,000.00
Towards Scalable Computer Defenses
FY 2015-16
Summary
We seem to be losing the battle of computer security. Despite increasing investments in software security on all sides, attackers are still able to bypass defenses seemingly at will. The situation is so bad that large network administrators must assume that their networks have already been infiltrated no matter how much effort they put in to their defenses.
We assert that the key reason for this seemingly hopeless situation is that attacks are scalable while computer defenses are not. Attackers can make fixed-cost investments in attack development (e.g., finding a zero-day exploit, deveolping an exploit deployment mechanism) that can allow them to compromise millions of hosts. Defenders, however, can expend an unbounded amount of resources deploying firewalls, installing anti-malware software, running intrusion prevention systems, and manually auditing their software and configuration, only to find that their systems have still been compromised - assuming they are fortunate enough to even notice.
We propose to study the theory and practice behind making scalable defenses. The key insight for building scalable defenses is that attacker work should scale with the population size of the defenders: attackers should be required to expend effort proportional to the number of hosts that are to be compromised. The key questions addressed in this research are first, how can we define defense scalability in terms of software architecture and economics, and to what extent are current defenses scalable. If this research is successful it should provide a foundation for building and evaluating a new generation of scalable computer defenses.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
RGPIN-2014-03782
Name nom
Somayaji, Anil
Department département
Computer Science, School of
Organization id
23
Institution établissement
Carleton University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2014
Award amount
32000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
801
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer software
Area of application fr
Logiciel
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Towards Scalable Computer Defenses
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
We seem to be losing the battle of computer security. Despite increasing investments in software security on all sides, attackers are still able to bypass defenses seemingly at will. The situation is so bad that large network administrators must assume that their networks have already been infiltrated no matter how much effort they put in to their defenses.
We assert that the key reason for this seemingly hopeless situation is that attacks are scalable while computer defenses are not. Attackers can make fixed-cost investments in attack development (e.g., finding a zero-day exploit, deveolping an exploit deployment mechanism) that can allow them to compromise millions of hosts. Defenders, however, can expend an unbounded amount of resources deploying firewalls, installing anti-malware software, running intrusion prevention systems, and manually auditing their software and configuration, only to find that their systems have still been compromised - assuming they are fortunate enough to even notice.
We propose to study the theory and practice behind making scalable defenses. The key insight for building scalable defenses is that attacker work should scale with the population size of the defenders: attackers should be required to expend effort proportional to the number of hosts that are to be compromised. The key questions addressed in this research are first, how can we define defense scalability in terms of software architecture and economics, and to what extent are current defenses scalable. If this research is successful it should provide a foundation for building and evaluating a new generation of scalable computer defenses.