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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of British Columbia

$25,000.00

Evolutionary games and population dynamics

FY 2013-14

Summary
Understanding the evolution of cooperation represents a core challenge to evolutionary biology and was recently selected among the 25 most important unresolved scientific questions published in Science. Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, ranging from bacterial colonies to human societies. However, cooperation is a conundrum, whereas exploitation is not. Cooperators incur costs and provide benefits to others, whereas cheaters reap the benefits but avoid the costs. Hence, Darwinian selection should favour cheaters, despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of cheaters. The problem of cooperation reduces to a conflict of interest between the group and the individual. Much theoretical and experimental effort has been expended to investigate mechanisms capable of resolving the dilemma and supporting the evolution of cooperation. Based on the mathematical framework of evolutionary game theory, this proposal aims at extending our understanding of three distinct mechanisms. First, investigating the interplay between ecological and evolutionary dynamics will enhance our theoretical understanding of evolutionary processes. In spatial settings, the feedback between ecology and evolution appears to support cooperation by initiating stable spatial heterogeneity in population densities and suggests a possible mechanism for spontaneous habitat diversification. Second, the concept of spatial extension is readily generalized to arbitrary population structures and, in particular, to social networks. Social interaction patterns are not static but change over time. Understanding the dynamics and the emerging structures of social networks creates promising opportunities to study form and function, for example, of virtual communities, such as eBay, Wikipedia or public forums. Third, the role of punishment, reward and reputation in enforcing or encouraging cooperation is modeled and related to human and animal populations. In a human context, this provides an evolutionary perspective on the establishment of sanctioning institutions as well as on the reasons for building most human societies on punishment instead of on socially more appealing rewarding mechanisms.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
British Columbia, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
355963-2008
Name nom
Hauert, Christoph
Department département
Mathematics
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2013
Competition year année de concours
2008
Award amount
25000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
18
Committee name en
Evolution & Ecology
Committee name fr
Évolution et écologie
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
4700
Research subject group en
Evolution and ecology
Research subject group fr
Évolution et écologie
Research subject en
Evolution and ecology
Research subject fr
Évolution et écologie
Partie
5
Nb partie
5
Application title
Evolutionary games and population dynamics
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Understanding the evolution of cooperation represents a core challenge to evolutionary biology and was recently selected among the 25 most important unresolved scientific questions published in Science. Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, ranging from bacterial colonies to human societies. However, cooperation is a conundrum, whereas exploitation is not. Cooperators incur costs and provide benefits to others, whereas cheaters reap the benefits but avoid the costs. Hence, Darwinian selection should favour cheaters, despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of cheaters. The problem of cooperation reduces to a conflict of interest between the group and the individual. Much theoretical and experimental effort has been expended to investigate mechanisms capable of resolving the dilemma and supporting the evolution of cooperation. Based on the mathematical framework of evolutionary game theory, this proposal aims at extending our understanding of three distinct mechanisms. First, investigating the interplay between ecological and evolutionary dynamics will enhance our theoretical understanding of evolutionary processes. In spatial settings, the feedback between ecology and evolution appears to support cooperation by initiating stable spatial heterogeneity in population densities and suggests a possible mechanism for spontaneous habitat diversification. Second, the concept of spatial extension is readily generalized to arbitrary population structures and, in particular, to social networks. Social interaction patterns are not static but change over time. Understanding the dynamics and the emerging structures of social networks creates promising opportunities to study form and function, for example, of virtual communities, such as eBay, Wikipedia or public forums. Third, the role of punishment, reward and reputation in enforcing or encouraging cooperation is modeled and related to human and animal populations. In a human context, this provides an evolutionary perspective on the establishment of sanctioning institutions as well as on the reasons for building most human societies on punishment instead of on socially more appealing rewarding mechanisms.