Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of Toronto
$22,000.00
Dynamic Matching in a Sharing Economy
FY 2017-18
Summary
This research aims to study dynamic matching in a sharing economy to maximize the total social welfare, by (1) exploring structures of optimal policies and (2) designing efficiently computable heuristic policies . To be specific, I propose to study the question of how to match supply with demand in a sharing economy under inter-temporal uncertainty on both sides. What is typically involved in a sharing economy is a two-sided market consisting of the supply and demand side and an intermediary market maker. There are different types of supply and demand. Matching different types of supply and demand incurs different costs. The intermediary organization/platform serves to coordinate supply and demand of different types. For example, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the United States allocates donated organs to patients in need of transplantation. Given prices of supply are irrelevant (e.g., in organ transplantation) or exogenously given, matching at the operational level can provide an efficient way for the platform to allocate crowdsourced supply across different demand types inter-temporally . Practitioners of a sharing platform need quantitatively implementable tools to efficiently match supply and demand, taking into account that over time, there will be new arrivals of supply and demand to the market, and unmatched supply and demand may abandon the wait. Under a discrete-time dynamic programming formulation, I plan to (1) study the structures of the optimal matching policies. Then I plan to (2) derive heuristic policies, based on approximation methods, which the platform can implement to achieve near-optimal social welfare maximization. For certain heuristic policies, I plan to (3) derive their worst-case performance bounds. I suggest to extend the base formulation to 4 different directions, to account for (1) continuous-time arrivals of supply and demand, (2) endogenized pricing decisions, (3) competition between sharing platforms and (4) dynamic matching over a network. My proposed research is expected to make impacts. First , designing optimal inter-temporal matching policies would enable platforms to achieve higher efficiency and social welfare. I plan to seek possible test and implementation of the derived policies in currently operating sharing platforms. Second , the proposed general framework builds on inventory management (that focuses on the supply side) and revenue management (that focuses on the demand side), the two foundations of operations management/research. Given my publication record in the top operations journals, I am confident of having a couple of high-quality papers coming out of this research proposal (on dynamic matching of both the supply and demand side), which are expected to attract many follow-up works from the community of operations research and management science.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
RGPIN-2015-06757
Name nom
Hu, Ming
Department département
Joseph L. Rotman School of Management - Joseph L. Rotman School of Management
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2017
Competition year année de concours
2015
Award amount
22000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1509
Committee name en
Civil, Industrial and Systems Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie civil, industriel et des systèmes
Area of application code
520
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Production and operations management
Area of application fr
Production et gestion des opérations
Research subject code
1601
Research subject group en
Industrial engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie industriel
Research subject en
Operations research and management science
Research subject fr
Recherche opérationnelle et science de la gestion
Partie
3
Nb partie
5
Application title
Dynamic Matching in a Sharing Economy
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
This research aims to study dynamic matching in a sharing economy to maximize the total social welfare, by (1) exploring structures of optimal policies and (2) designing efficiently computable heuristic policies . To be specific, I propose to study the question of how to match supply with demand in a sharing economy under inter-temporal uncertainty on both sides. What is typically involved in a sharing economy is a two-sided market consisting of the supply and demand side and an intermediary market maker. There are different types of supply and demand. Matching different types of supply and demand incurs different costs. The intermediary organization/platform serves to coordinate supply and demand of different types. For example, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the United States allocates donated organs to patients in need of transplantation. Given prices of supply are irrelevant (e.g., in organ transplantation) or exogenously given, matching at the operational level can provide an efficient way for the platform to allocate crowdsourced supply across different demand types inter-temporally . Practitioners of a sharing platform need quantitatively implementable tools to efficiently match supply and demand, taking into account that over time, there will be new arrivals of supply and demand to the market, and unmatched supply and demand may abandon the wait. Under a discrete-time dynamic programming formulation, I plan to (1) study the structures of the optimal matching policies. Then I plan to (2) derive heuristic policies, based on approximation methods, which the platform can implement to achieve near-optimal social welfare maximization. For certain heuristic policies, I plan to (3) derive their worst-case performance bounds. I suggest to extend the base formulation to 4 different directions, to account for (1) continuous-time arrivals of supply and demand, (2) endogenized pricing decisions, (3) competition between sharing platforms and (4) dynamic matching over a network. My proposed research is expected to make impacts. First , designing optimal inter-temporal matching policies would enable platforms to achieve higher efficiency and social welfare. I plan to seek possible test and implementation of the derived policies in currently operating sharing platforms. Second , the proposed general framework builds on inventory management (that focuses on the supply side) and revenue management (that focuses on the demand side), the two foundations of operations management/research. Given my publication record in the top operations journals, I am confident of having a couple of high-quality papers coming out of this research proposal (on dynamic matching of both the supply and demand side), which are expected to attract many follow-up works from the community of operations research and management science.