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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Toronto

$22,000.00

Security and Fault Tolerance of Cyber-Physical Systems

FY 2017-18

Summary
Critical infrastructures such as power grids, water supply systems, and traffic networks involve networked control systems with distributed sensors and actuators. We refer to them as cyber-physical systems. One key requirement for such systems is security from malicious attacks, often in the form of cyber-attacks aimed at compromising supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The second key requirement is fault tolerance: the ability of the control system to continue functioning despite component failures. Component failures can occur as a consequence of malicious actions by an attacker, but can also occur as a result of hardware breakdown or unforeseen operating conditions. Most approaches to combat cyber-attacks focus on prevention through firewalls. With the advent of smart sensors and stealth technologies, preventing access and detecting intrusion are becoming increasingly difficult. There is an urgent need to develop counter-measures that can combat malicious intruders after intrusion has occurred. Traditional approaches to fault-tolerant control design are also inadequate as they often rely on first carrying out accurate fault diagnosis, followed by control reconfiguration. The system may be damaged or irrecoverable while waiting for diagnostic information. Our proposed research aims to improve the security and fault-tolerance of control systems central to cyber-physical systems. The two main objectives of our proposed research program are: (1) to develop novel methodology to detect malicious intruders and prevent them from inflicting damage to the control system; and (2) to maintain functionality and safe operation of control systems when components fail. The first objective focuses on security at the system level, typically involving SCADA systems describable using discrete event system models. Our methodology will make use of the theory of supervisory control and diagnosis for discrete event systems to perform intrusion detection and to counteract malicious behaviour. The novelty in our formulation is our focus on the control aspects after an intrusion has occurred, on how the feedback loop induces interactions between the actions of the attacker and defender. The second objective focuses on resilience of the control system at the physical level when actuators and/or sensors fail. The novelty of our approach is that we focus on decentralized fault-tolerant control design which does not depend on accurate diagnostic knowledge. We propose to study fault-tolerant control as an integrated problem of distributed diagnosis and control reconfiguration, exploiting redundancies through coupling, and investigate network effects such as cascading failures. Protecting cyber-physical systems is of great national interest. Our proposed research can provide significant improvements on the security and resilience of cyber-physical systems.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
RGPIN-2015-04273
Name nom
Kwong, Raymond
Department département
Electrical & Computer Engineering - Electrical & Computer Engineering
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2017
Competition year année de concours
2015
Award amount
22000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1510
Committee name en
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie électrique et informatique
Area of application code
1207
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Information, computer and communication technologies
Area of application fr
Technologie de l'information, des ordinateurs et des réseaux de communications
Research subject code
2509
Research subject group en
Electrical and electronic engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie électrique et électronique
Research subject en
Control systems
Research subject fr
Asservissements
Partie
3
Nb partie
5
Application title
Security and Fault Tolerance of Cyber-Physical Systems
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Critical infrastructures such as power grids, water supply systems, and traffic networks involve networked control systems with distributed sensors and actuators. We refer to them as cyber-physical systems. One key requirement for such systems is security from malicious attacks, often in the form of cyber-attacks aimed at compromising supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The second key requirement is fault tolerance: the ability of the control system to continue functioning despite component failures. Component failures can occur as a consequence of malicious actions by an attacker, but can also occur as a result of hardware breakdown or unforeseen operating conditions. Most approaches to combat cyber-attacks focus on prevention through firewalls. With the advent of smart sensors and stealth technologies, preventing access and detecting intrusion are becoming increasingly difficult. There is an urgent need to develop counter-measures that can combat malicious intruders after intrusion has occurred. Traditional approaches to fault-tolerant control design are also inadequate as they often rely on first carrying out accurate fault diagnosis, followed by control reconfiguration. The system may be damaged or irrecoverable while waiting for diagnostic information. Our proposed research aims to improve the security and fault-tolerance of control systems central to cyber-physical systems. The two main objectives of our proposed research program are: (1) to develop novel methodology to detect malicious intruders and prevent them from inflicting damage to the control system; and (2) to maintain functionality and safe operation of control systems when components fail. The first objective focuses on security at the system level, typically involving SCADA systems describable using discrete event system models. Our methodology will make use of the theory of supervisory control and diagnosis for discrete event systems to perform intrusion detection and to counteract malicious behaviour. The novelty in our formulation is our focus on the control aspects after an intrusion has occurred, on how the feedback loop induces interactions between the actions of the attacker and defender. The second objective focuses on resilience of the control system at the physical level when actuators and/or sensors fail. The novelty of our approach is that we focus on decentralized fault-tolerant control design which does not depend on accurate diagnostic knowledge. We propose to study fault-tolerant control as an integrated problem of distributed diagnosis and control reconfiguration, exploiting redundancies through coupling, and investigate network effects such as cascading failures. Protecting cyber-physical systems is of great national interest. Our proposed research can provide significant improvements on the security and resilience of cyber-physical systems.