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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

Université Laval

$19,000.00

Design and implementation of combinatorail auctions for multilateral markets

FY 2010-11

Summary
In the last two decades, auctions have received a lot of attention in economics, operations research and computer science literature. All reported studies in auctions design field recognized the potential benefits of the, so-called, combinatorial auctions, especially when complementarities exist between the traded items. Combinatorial auctions refer to auction mechanisms in which bids on combinations of items are permitted. A significant effort has been devoted since the mid-1990's to the elaboration of advanced ''package bidding'' auction techniques. The majority of this research considers however unilateral markets, i.e., markets including either, one seller and multiple buyers or one buyer and multiple sellers. This research program addresses the problem of designing and implementing combinatorial auctions in multilateral markets where multiple sellers and buyers trade heterogeneous items. The objective is to provide the actors of the market with optimized decision tools to help them solve some of the problems they would face during or after the auction process. The emphasis will be put on three inter-related decision problems: (1) Who are the final winners? (2) What should every participant pay or receive at the end of the auction? (3) What is the best strategy for constructing bids? The originality of the proposed approaches consists in combining mathematical modeling and optimization techniques, proper to the operations research field, and cost sharing and pricing methods, used in cooperative game theroy. Such a combination is relevant in a multilateral context where combinatorial bids are permitted. All the proposed approaches will be evaluated through generated and real-life problem tests arising in various contexts such as transportation service procurement or electricity markets. They will thus contribute to both industrial and academic environements.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
Quebec, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
371655-2009
Name nom
Rekik, Monia
Department département
Opérations et systèmes de décision
Organization id
51
Institution établissement
Université Laval
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2010
Competition year année de concours
2009
Award amount
19000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
20
Committee name en
Industrial Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie industriel
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
2950
Research subject group en
Applied mathematics
Research subject group fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Research subject en
Applied mathematics
Research subject fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Design and implementation of combinatorail auctions for multilateral markets
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
In the last two decades, auctions have received a lot of attention in economics, operations research and computer science literature. All reported studies in auctions design field recognized the potential benefits of the, so-called, combinatorial auctions, especially when complementarities exist between the traded items. Combinatorial auctions refer to auction mechanisms in which bids on combinations of items are permitted. A significant effort has been devoted since the mid-1990's to the elaboration of advanced ''package bidding'' auction techniques. The majority of this research considers however unilateral markets, i.e., markets including either, one seller and multiple buyers or one buyer and multiple sellers. This research program addresses the problem of designing and implementing combinatorial auctions in multilateral markets where multiple sellers and buyers trade heterogeneous items. The objective is to provide the actors of the market with optimized decision tools to help them solve some of the problems they would face during or after the auction process. The emphasis will be put on three inter-related decision problems: (1) Who are the final winners? (2) What should every participant pay or receive at the end of the auction? (3) What is the best strategy for constructing bids? The originality of the proposed approaches consists in combining mathematical modeling and optimization techniques, proper to the operations research field, and cost sharing and pricing methods, used in cooperative game theroy. Such a combination is relevant in a multilateral context where combinatorial bids are permitted. All the proposed approaches will be evaluated through generated and real-life problem tests arising in various contexts such as transportation service procurement or electricity markets. They will thus contribute to both industrial and academic environements.