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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Calgary

$18,000.00

Optimal insurance design in the presence of imperfect information

FY 2022-23

Summary
Insurance is one of the most important risk management tools to hedge the risks of policyholders and meanwhile provides the insurance companies opportunities for profit. Among various decision-making problems, the design of optimal insurance has been put at the forefront of actuarial studies for decades. The myriad insurance models studied in the past literature always assume that the insurance companies have perfect knowledge of the market including the policyholders' loss distributions and their actual losses. However, this assumption may not be true as it sounds to be. With the rapid development of information technology, the insurance companies can now get access to more information of their clients, but their knowledge is still limited due to: first, the company lacks real loss data; and second, clients are often reluctant to report their real situations. The limited knowledge or imperfect information could inevitably give rise to the adverse selection, ex post moral hazard and model ambiguity issues.  This proposed research program aims to address the above issues through properly designing the insurance contract. More specifically, I and my research group are going to: A) design a "menu" of the tailored insurance contracts for policyholders with different risk profiles; B) Utilizing the randomization mechanism to reduce the potential ex post moral hazard; C) Design the optimal actual-loss-based and index-based indemnification functions simultaneously in the expected utility framework; D) design the optimal insurance contract from the policyholder's perspective when considering the model ambiguity. The novelties of this research program include: A) the design of optimal insurance contract in a more complex environment which incorporates information asymmetry and uncertainty; B) the design of optimal insurance contract within the most recently developed economic framework; C) the development of more efficient sequential search and iterative computing algorithms to deal with the infinite dimensional optimization problem. The requested funding will be used to support the trainees in my research team. Each trainee will be assigned one task as per the research proposal. The NSERC funding, as well as other complementary funding, will be used to pay the trainees' salaries, equipment fees, travel and other related expenses.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Location
Alberta, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
RGPIN-2020-04204
Name nom
Jiang, Wenjun
Department département
Mathematics and Statistics - Mathematics and Statistics
Organization id
11
Institution établissement
University of Calgary
Province en
Alberta
Province fr
Alberta
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2022
Competition year année de concours
2020
Award amount
18000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1508
Committee name en
Mathematics and Statistics
Committee name fr
Mathématiques et statistique
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
3000
Research subject group en
Statistics and probability
Research subject group fr
Statistique et probabilité
Research subject en
Statistics and probability
Research subject fr
Statistique et probabilité
Installment
inst:3
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
Optimal insurance design in the presence of imperfect information
Application summary
Insurance is one of the most important risk management tools to hedge the risks of policyholders and meanwhile provides the insurance companies opportunities for profit. Among various decision-making problems, the design of optimal insurance has been put at the forefront of actuarial studies for decades. The myriad insurance models studied in the past literature always assume that the insurance companies have perfect knowledge of the market including the policyholders' loss distributions and their actual losses. However, this assumption may not be true as it sounds to be. With the rapid development of information technology, the insurance companies can now get access to more information of their clients, but their knowledge is still limited due to: first, the company lacks real loss data; and second, clients are often reluctant to report their real situations. The limited knowledge or imperfect information could inevitably give rise to the adverse selection, ex post moral hazard and model ambiguity issues.  This proposed research program aims to address the above issues through properly designing the insurance contract. More specifically, I and my research group are going to: A) design a "menu" of the tailored insurance contracts for policyholders with different risk profiles; B) Utilizing the randomization mechanism to reduce the potential ex post moral hazard; C) Design the optimal actual-loss-based and index-based indemnification functions simultaneously in the expected utility framework; D) design the optimal insurance contract from the policyholder's perspective when considering the model ambiguity. The novelties of this research program include: A) the design of optimal insurance contract in a more complex environment which incorporates information asymmetry and uncertainty; B) the design of optimal insurance contract within the most recently developed economic framework; C) the development of more efficient sequential search and iterative computing algorithms to deal with the infinite dimensional optimization problem. The requested funding will be used to support the trainees in my research team. Each trainee will be assigned one task as per the research proposal. The NSERC funding, as well as other complementary funding, will be used to pay the trainees' salaries, equipment fees, travel and other related expenses.