Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Wilfrid Laurier University
$15,000.00
Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory
FY 2013-14
Summary
The overall objective of my research program is to develop the theory of evolutionary games and its applications to biology and economics. The basic static concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) has played a key role in the mathematical modeling of individual behaviour in conflict situations by also predicting the eventual behavioral distribution of standard single-species frequency-dependent evolutionary processes such as the replicator dynamics. Less well-understood are the dynamic consequences of the ESS concept (and its generalizations) for ecological systems when there are many species and/or population sizes evolve. The proposed research program will examine these consequences for predator-prey interactions and for more general coevolutionary models in ecology. I have recently shown that behavioral (i.e. frequency) effects and ecological (i.e. population size) effects decouple when analyzing the spatial distribution of a single-species among different habitats, providing a thorough understanding of these ""habitat-selection"" games. The proposed game-theoretic approach has the potential to provide a similar understanding of the much more complex biological systems involving more than one species. Predator foraging behaviour is of fundamental importance when modeling predator-prey systems. The proposed research seeks to predict sequential predator foraging decisions through the theory of extensive form games, a natural setting to model such ongoing interactions. This is a novel research direction and is an important initial stage connecting extensive form games to biology. The other objective is to investigate the evolution of cooperation in theoretical models and in corresponding game experiments, topics of much current interest for many prominent research groups. Explanations based on evolutionary game theory have typically assumed that players' payoffs depend only on their strategies and not on other factors such as their status. The proposal will incorporate asymmetries such as those between young and old, owner and non-owner of a resource into the model. Theoretical results will be compared to those from human game experiments to better understand mechanisms that generate cooperative behaviour.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
7822-2013
Name nom
Cressman, Ross
Department département
Mathematics
Organization id
35
Institution établissement
Wilfrid Laurier University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2013
Competition year année de concours
2013
Award amount
15000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1508
Committee name en
Mathematics and Statistics
Committee name fr
Mathématiques et statistique
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
2950
Research subject group en
Applied mathematics
Research subject group fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Research subject en
Applied mathematics
Research subject fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The overall objective of my research program is to develop the theory of evolutionary games and its applications to biology and economics. The basic static concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) has played a key role in the mathematical modeling of individual behaviour in conflict situations by also predicting the eventual behavioral distribution of standard single-species frequency-dependent evolutionary processes such as the replicator dynamics. Less well-understood are the dynamic consequences of the ESS concept (and its generalizations) for ecological systems when there are many species and/or population sizes evolve. The proposed research program will examine these consequences for predator-prey interactions and for more general coevolutionary models in ecology. I have recently shown that behavioral (i.e. frequency) effects and ecological (i.e. population size) effects decouple when analyzing the spatial distribution of a single-species among different habitats, providing a thorough understanding of these ""habitat-selection"" games. The proposed game-theoretic approach has the potential to provide a similar understanding of the much more complex biological systems involving more than one species. Predator foraging behaviour is of fundamental importance when modeling predator-prey systems. The proposed research seeks to predict sequential predator foraging decisions through the theory of extensive form games, a natural setting to model such ongoing interactions. This is a novel research direction and is an important initial stage connecting extensive form games to biology. The other objective is to investigate the evolution of cooperation in theoretical models and in corresponding game experiments, topics of much current interest for many prominent research groups. Explanations based on evolutionary game theory have typically assumed that players' payoffs depend only on their strategies and not on other factors such as their status. The proposal will incorporate asymmetries such as those between young and old, owner and non-owner of a resource into the model. Theoretical results will be compared to those from human game experiments to better understand mechanisms that generate cooperative behaviour.