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Grant: Engage Grants Program

Concordia University

$25,000.00

Analysis of Linux Container-based Security Mechanisms

FY 2015-16

Summary
Virtual machines (VMs) and hypervisors are typically relied on to achieve isolation between mutually hostile or untrustworthy applications. In recent times, the phenomenal growth of cloud computing and data centers lead to renewed interest in OS-based, lightweight isolation mechanisms due to their superior performance. This research will first identify key differences (from a security perspective) in existing virtualization technologies based on traditional hypervisors (e.g., virtual machines), and operating systems (e.g., Linux containers). We will then perform a security analysis of different OS-level virtualization mechanisms, with the focus on Linux containers. Particularly, we would like to understand how containerization could be attacked and how its security could be improved in order to build a more secure isolation technique for multi-tenant, untrusted environment, specifically for data center operations. We will analyze the limits of resource isolation provided by Linux containers, and consider the following attack avenues: exploiting shared hardware resources that are not isolated by containers (e.g., processor cache, memory, input/output devices); and exploitation of known Linux kernel vulnerabilities that may allow a malicious application to breakout of the confinement of a container. We will then outline some recommendations on how the identified limitations (if any) can be alleviated for a safer cloud computing environment, which is the primary goal of our industry partner, Huawei Canada. We will consult with our contacts at Huawei, and seek their feedback in all steps of this project. Results from our analysis is expected to help Huawei in choosing OS-based isolation mechanisms for their data center environment.
Program
Engage Grants Program
Location
Quebec, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

As published

Application id
487286-2015
Name nom
Mannan, Mohammad
Department département
Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering (CIISE)
Organization id
70
Institution établissement
Concordia University
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2015
Award amount
25000
Program id
EGP
Program name en
Engage Grants Program
Program name fr
Programme de subventions d'engagement partenariat
Group en
Research partnerships programs
Group fr
Programmes de partenariat
Committee code
1552
Committee name en
Quebec Internal Decision Committee
Committee name fr
Comité de décision interne pour le Québec
Area of application code
801
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer software
Area of application fr
Logiciel
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
1
Nb partie
1
Application title
Analysis of Linux Container-based Security Mechanisms
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Virtual machines (VMs) and hypervisors are typically relied on to achieve isolation between mutually hostile or untrustworthy applications. In recent times, the phenomenal growth of cloud computing and data centers lead to renewed interest in OS-based, lightweight isolation mechanisms due to their superior performance. This research will first identify key differences (from a security perspective) in existing virtualization technologies based on traditional hypervisors (e.g., virtual machines), and operating systems (e.g., Linux containers). We will then perform a security analysis of different OS-level virtualization mechanisms, with the focus on Linux containers. Particularly, we would like to understand how containerization could be attacked and how its security could be improved in order to build a more secure isolation technique for multi-tenant, untrusted environment, specifically for data center operations. We will analyze the limits of resource isolation provided by Linux containers, and consider the following attack avenues: exploiting shared hardware resources that are not isolated by containers (e.g., processor cache, memory, input/output devices); and exploitation of known Linux kernel vulnerabilities that may allow a malicious application to breakout of the confinement of a container. We will then outline some recommendations on how the identified limitations (if any) can be alleviated for a safer cloud computing environment, which is the primary goal of our industry partner, Huawei Canada. We will consult with our contacts at Huawei, and seek their feedback in all steps of this project. Results from our analysis is expected to help Huawei in choosing OS-based isolation mechanisms for their data center environment.