Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Memorial University of Newfoundland
$29,000.00
False mental-state attribution in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
FY 2015-16
Summary
This project is a crucial piece of a larger research program spanning several disciplines that has been underway for over four decades: to piece together the origins of human theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute internal, mental states to others and to predict their behavior on that basis. Humans become adept at making judgments about what others perceive, feel, want, know, and intend from an early age. However, despite decades of research, whether our closest primate relatives, chimpanzees, share this ability is still a hotly debated issue. Some researchers claim there is enough evidence to conclude that chimpanzees can attribute perceptions, desires, intentions, and knowledge to others, but they are not able to infer mental states that are at odds with reality (e.g., false beliefs). Others argue that this conclusion is highly premature for two reasons: (1) the apes' ability to infer other types of false mental states (e.g., false perceptions) have not yet been tested; and (2) the positive results from some tests can be given simpler explanations: apes could have passed by using behavioral or environmental cues, without ever considering the mental state of the other individual. This is due to a pervasive methodological problem that cuts across all research carried out to date in this area, called Povinelli's Problem. My research aims to address the two issues listed above by testing false perception attribution in apes using a novel method that overcomes Povinelli's Problem. Chimpanzees will be given tasks in which they must predict another individual's behavior by making inferences about their mental state, in a situation that makes it impossible for them to use behavioral or environmental cues. The results will be of interest to anyone who strives to understand the evolutionary roots of our own social cognitive abilities. My research also has the potential to solve a longstanding methodological problem in the field and thus lead to greater consensus on the subject of ape theory of mind.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
435593-2013
Name nom
Krachun, Carla
Department département
Psychology (Corner Brook)
Organization id
89
Institution établissement
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Province en
Newfoundland and Labrador
Province fr
Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2015
Competition year année de concours
2013
Award amount
29000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1200
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application fr
Avancement des connaissances
Research subject code
6304
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Cognitive science -- fundamental
Research subject fr
Science cognitive -- principes fondamentaux
Partie
3
Nb partie
5
Application title
False mental-state attribution in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
This project is a crucial piece of a larger research program spanning several disciplines that has been underway for over four decades: to piece together the origins of human theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute internal, mental states to others and to predict their behavior on that basis. Humans become adept at making judgments about what others perceive, feel, want, know, and intend from an early age. However, despite decades of research, whether our closest primate relatives, chimpanzees, share this ability is still a hotly debated issue. Some researchers claim there is enough evidence to conclude that chimpanzees can attribute perceptions, desires, intentions, and knowledge to others, but they are not able to infer mental states that are at odds with reality (e.g., false beliefs). Others argue that this conclusion is highly premature for two reasons: (1) the apes' ability to infer other types of false mental states (e.g., false perceptions) have not yet been tested; and (2) the positive results from some tests can be given simpler explanations: apes could have passed by using behavioral or environmental cues, without ever considering the mental state of the other individual. This is due to a pervasive methodological problem that cuts across all research carried out to date in this area, called Povinelli's Problem. My research aims to address the two issues listed above by testing false perception attribution in apes using a novel method that overcomes Povinelli's Problem. Chimpanzees will be given tasks in which they must predict another individual's behavior by making inferences about their mental state, in a situation that makes it impossible for them to use behavioral or environmental cues. The results will be of interest to anyone who strives to understand the evolutionary roots of our own social cognitive abilities. My research also has the potential to solve a longstanding methodological problem in the field and thus lead to greater consensus on the subject of ape theory of mind.