Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of Waterloo
$11,000.00
Security of algebraic curves in cryptography
FY 2012-13
Summary
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and generalizations such as hyperelliptic curve cryptography represent the most efficiently implementable public key cryptosystems available today for a given level of security. All other public key cryptosystems, such as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) either admit subexponential time attacks or have not been subjected to the same level of scrutiny for a sufficiently long period of time to warrant confidence in their security. For this reason, ECC has been widely adopted in international standards as the preferred cryptosystem for security sensitive or resource constrained environments. A notable application of ECC is in the area of security for mobile phones, where lower computational power often precludes the use of less efficient alternatives.
Although ECC is widely believed to be secure, the exact level of security provided by elliptic curves remains an open question. Unlike traditional cryptosystems such as RSA, where all systems of a given parameter size are equally secure, it is not known whether elliptic curves of the same size provide equal security. The choice of curve is highly relevant in practice because different curves can lead to different performance profiles or feature sets. For example, Koblitz curves have faster implementations compared to other curves, and pairing-friendly curves enable the use of cryptographic protocols that require pairings. Uncertainty regarding the security of such curves has led to the development of conflicting recommendations within international standards documents. Some documents recommend the use of pairing-friendly curves based on their increased feature set, while others forbid the use of pairing-friendly curves, citing security concerns.
My research aims to answer the question of whether elliptic curve security varies depending on the choice of curve, by computing explicit algebraic security reductions between the various possible choices of curves. In addition, this research is expected to produce (and has produced in the past) new elliptic-curve based cryptosystems, faster implementations, and new attacks and cryptanalysis of ECC-based protocols.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
341769-2011
Name nom
Jao, David
Department département
Combinatorics and Optimization
Organization id
33
Institution établissement
University of Waterloo
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2012
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
11000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1508
Committee name en
Mathematics and Statistics
Committee name fr
Mathématiques et statistique
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
2913
Research subject group en
Pure mathematics
Research subject group fr
Mathématiques pures
Research subject en
Number theory
Research subject fr
Théorie des nombres
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Security of algebraic curves in cryptography
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and generalizations such as hyperelliptic curve cryptography represent the most efficiently implementable public key cryptosystems available today for a given level of security. All other public key cryptosystems, such as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) either admit subexponential time attacks or have not been subjected to the same level of scrutiny for a sufficiently long period of time to warrant confidence in their security. For this reason, ECC has been widely adopted in international standards as the preferred cryptosystem for security sensitive or resource constrained environments. A notable application of ECC is in the area of security for mobile phones, where lower computational power often precludes the use of less efficient alternatives.
Although ECC is widely believed to be secure, the exact level of security provided by elliptic curves remains an open question. Unlike traditional cryptosystems such as RSA, where all systems of a given parameter size are equally secure, it is not known whether elliptic curves of the same size provide equal security. The choice of curve is highly relevant in practice because different curves can lead to different performance profiles or feature sets. For example, Koblitz curves have faster implementations compared to other curves, and pairing-friendly curves enable the use of cryptographic protocols that require pairings. Uncertainty regarding the security of such curves has led to the development of conflicting recommendations within international standards documents. Some documents recommend the use of pairing-friendly curves based on their increased feature set, while others forbid the use of pairing-friendly curves, citing security concerns.
My research aims to answer the question of whether elliptic curve security varies depending on the choice of curve, by computing explicit algebraic security reductions between the various possible choices of curves. In addition, this research is expected to produce (and has produced in the past) new elliptic-curve based cryptosystems, faster implementations, and new attacks and cryptanalysis of ECC-based protocols.