Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of British Columbia
$21,000.00
On some problems in dynamic pricing, revenue management and cost and revenue allocation
FY 2013-14
Summary
The proposed research will address the following three issues/topics:(i) Ordinarily, it is assumed that, faced with price competition, retailers follow the Nash equilibrium paradigm. That is, they price-deviate if such a deviation is strictly profitable for them. However, it is well recognized that retailers who follow the Nash paradigm are short-sighted. They completely fail to consider the effect of their deviations on other players, which eventually would lead to pricing at the marginal cost for undifferentiated products. Accordingly, one of my objectives is to endow retailers with foresight, as embodied by the largest consistent set introduced by Chwe (JET, 1994), and its possible other refinements, and to evaluate the effect of the behavior of farsighted retailers on prices and profits in a multi-period duopoly competition model.(ii) One of my objectives is to study a multi-period duopoly model wherein consumers are assumed to differ along the store-loyalty criterion. Some of the consumers are store-loyal, while others are store-switchers, due perhaps to their variety seeking desires. Explicitly, I plan to endow consumers with a utility function which accounts for the benefits of having a variety among service providers, and I will investigate the effect of the existence of such consumers on prices and profits in a multi-period duopoly competition model. (iii) I plan to analyze revenue and cost allocation problems in which the core of the corresponding cooperative game is empty. Specifically, I seek to find the smallest additional revenue or cost that has to be contributed by a third party, and which would lead to a non-empty core. Partial results were already obtained for a cooperative game induced by a routing problem on a graph, where I have shown that the smallest additional cost, that has to be contributed by a third party, leading to a non-empty core, can be found in cubic time in the number of players when the minimal edge-cutest in the graph is of cardinality three or more.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
British Columbia, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
4181-2011
Name nom
Granot, Daniel
Department département
Sauder School of Business
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2013
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
21000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1509
Committee name en
Civil, Industrial and Systems Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie civil, industriel et des systèmes
Area of application code
520
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Production and operations management
Area of application fr
Production et gestion des opérations
Research subject code
1600
Research subject group en
Industrial engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie industriel
Research subject en
Industrial engineering
Research subject fr
Génie industriel
Partie
3
Nb partie
5
Application title
On some problems in dynamic pricing, revenue management and cost and revenue allocation
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The proposed research will address the following three issues/topics:(i) Ordinarily, it is assumed that, faced with price competition, retailers follow the Nash equilibrium paradigm. That is, they price-deviate if such a deviation is strictly profitable for them. However, it is well recognized that retailers who follow the Nash paradigm are short-sighted. They completely fail to consider the effect of their deviations on other players, which eventually would lead to pricing at the marginal cost for undifferentiated products. Accordingly, one of my objectives is to endow retailers with foresight, as embodied by the largest consistent set introduced by Chwe (JET, 1994), and its possible other refinements, and to evaluate the effect of the behavior of farsighted retailers on prices and profits in a multi-period duopoly competition model.(ii) One of my objectives is to study a multi-period duopoly model wherein consumers are assumed to differ along the store-loyalty criterion. Some of the consumers are store-loyal, while others are store-switchers, due perhaps to their variety seeking desires. Explicitly, I plan to endow consumers with a utility function which accounts for the benefits of having a variety among service providers, and I will investigate the effect of the existence of such consumers on prices and profits in a multi-period duopoly competition model. (iii) I plan to analyze revenue and cost allocation problems in which the core of the corresponding cooperative game is empty. Specifically, I seek to find the smallest additional revenue or cost that has to be contributed by a third party, and which would lead to a non-empty core. Partial results were already obtained for a cooperative game induced by a routing problem on a graph, where I have shown that the smallest additional cost, that has to be contributed by a third party, leading to a non-empty core, can be found in cubic time in the number of players when the minimal edge-cutest in the graph is of cardinality three or more.