Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of British Columbia
$51,000.00
Understanding humans' understanding of agency: studies with preverbal infants
FY 2019-20
Summary
A paradigmatic achievement of the human mind is the recognition that the world is made up of two fundamentally different kinds of entities: agents whose actions are internally driven by unseen mental states, and non-agents whose actions are externally driven by rule-like physical properties. Accurately distinguishing agents from non-agents in the environment is a critical first step for various processes essential for human survival and flourishing, from basic moment-to-moment hazard avoidance to the ability to enter into long-term cooperative relationships with others. Given the essential nature of agency detection, when and how human beings accurately identify agents in their environment is of particular theoretical importance, and so the developmental origins of agency detection have received considerable empirical attention over the last few decades. To date, one agency cue has been extremely well studied in adults, and yet largely ignored in infancy research: the valence of an action's effect. Indeed, though most adults hold the explicit belief that the outcome of an action should have no bearing on one's conception of what caused the outcome or why, a growing body of research suggests that adults are nevertheless biased to attribute agency to the causes of particularly positive or negative outcomes in their environment. Such results suggest that, for adults, the relationship between unseen mental states and observable real-world actions and outcomes is cognitively bidirectional: just as attributions of mental states influence evaluations of outcomes, evaluations of outcomes influence attributions of mental states. The research proposed below includes 4 sets of experiments using behavioural, eye-tracking, and EEG measures with infants from 6-12 months of age to follow up on exciting preliminary evidence from my lab suggestive that infants, too, attribute agency to the non-agentive causes of valenced (particularly negative) outcomes. Further evidence for this bidirectional relationship in infancy would support the possibility that mental states and action evaluations are mutually influential from very early in life, suggestive that bidirectionality is a fundamental aspect of the human mentalizing system.
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
British Columbia, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
RGPIN-2016-03775
Name nom
Hamlin, Jane
Department département
Psychology
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2019
Competition year année de concours
2016
Award amount
51000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1200
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application fr
Avancement des connaissances
Research subject code
6305
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Cognitive science -- development
Research subject fr
Science cognitive -- développement
Installment
inst:4 - 5
Partie
4
Nb partie
5
Application title
Understanding humans' understanding of agency: studies with preverbal infants
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
A paradigmatic achievement of the human mind is the recognition that the world is made up of two fundamentally different kinds of entities: agents whose actions are internally driven by unseen mental states, and non-agents whose actions are externally driven by rule-like physical properties. Accurately distinguishing agents from non-agents in the environment is a critical first step for various processes essential for human survival and flourishing, from basic moment-to-moment hazard avoidance to the ability to enter into long-term cooperative relationships with others. Given the essential nature of agency detection, when and how human beings accurately identify agents in their environment is of particular theoretical importance, and so the developmental origins of agency detection have received considerable empirical attention over the last few decades. To date, one agency cue has been extremely well studied in adults, and yet largely ignored in infancy research: the valence of an action's effect. Indeed, though most adults hold the explicit belief that the outcome of an action should have no bearing on one's conception of what caused the outcome or why, a growing body of research suggests that adults are nevertheless biased to attribute agency to the causes of particularly positive or negative outcomes in their environment. Such results suggest that, for adults, the relationship between unseen mental states and observable real-world actions and outcomes is cognitively bidirectional: just as attributions of mental states influence evaluations of outcomes, evaluations of outcomes influence attributions of mental states. The research proposed below includes 4 sets of experiments using behavioural, eye-tracking, and EEG measures with infants from 6-12 months of age to follow up on exciting preliminary evidence from my lab suggestive that infants, too, attribute agency to the non-agentive causes of valenced (particularly negative) outcomes. Further evidence for this bidirectional relationship in infancy would support the possibility that mental states and action evaluations are mutually influential from very early in life, suggestive that bidirectionality is a fundamental aspect of the human mentalizing system.