Grant: Collaborative Research and Development Grants
University of Waterloo
$76,281.00
Protocol Security Analysis for Discrete Modulated Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution
FY 2020-21
Summary
The emergence of quantum computers forces us to change the cryptographic infrastructure securing our data storage and communication structures. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) will be part of this new infrastructure as it can provide implementation security independent of future technological and algorithmic advances. Much conceptional and practical effort has to be made to make QKD compatible with modern optical communication technology to allow adoption of this technology within the broader telecom service provider market. QKD could be used to secure the telecommunication infrastructure or also to provide key management service to end customers. The requirement for the successful adoption will be stable equipment that fits seamless to existing infrastructure and use essentially the same components as the modern classical communication equipment.
Over the recent years, immense progress has been made in our ability to analyze the security and performance of quantum key distribution protocols and their optical implementation. Initially the focus was on QKD technology that requires technology able to detect single photons, the smallest amount of light detectable. More recently, QKD systems based on modern homodyne and heterodyne detection technology were developed which use standard optical detection schemes as they are used in modern optical communication. No single-photon detection is required for these protocols, opening potentially the path for cheaper and faster QKD schemes. However, while some idealized situations of these protocols can now be readily analyzed, some desirable protocols, so called discrete-modulated continuous variable protocols, have resisted yet a full security analysis due to missing security proof techniques. In this proposal we will be developing new tools and methods for security proofs that are applicable to these desirable protocols. Only with clear formulated security proofs will we be able to deploy the new schemes to secure our infrastructure.
Program
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Recipient
Location
Ontario, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
522308-2017
Name nom
Lutkenhaus, Norbert
Department département
Physics and Astronomy
Organization id
33
Institution établissement
University of Waterloo
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2020
Competition year année de concours
2017
Award amount
76281
Program id
CRDPJ
Program name en
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Program name fr
Subventions de recherche et développement coopérative
Group en
Research partnerships programs
Group fr
Programmes de partenariat
Committee code
96
Committee name en
RPP Internal Decision Cttee
Committee name fr
Cté de décision interne - PPR
Area of application code
1207
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Information, computer and communication technologies
Area of application fr
Technologie de l'information, des ordinateurs et des réseaux de communications
Research subject code
3112
Research subject group en
Physics
Research subject group fr
Physique
Research subject en
Photonics
Research subject fr
Photonique
Installment
inst:3 - 3
Partie
1
Nb partie
3
Application title
Protocol Security Analysis for Discrete Modulated Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The emergence of quantum computers forces us to change the cryptographic infrastructure securing our data storage and communication structures. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) will be part of this new infrastructure as it can provide implementation security independent of future technological and algorithmic advances. Much conceptional and practical effort has to be made to make QKD compatible with modern optical communication technology to allow adoption of this technology within the broader telecom service provider market. QKD could be used to secure the telecommunication infrastructure or also to provide key management service to end customers. The requirement for the successful adoption will be stable equipment that fits seamless to existing infrastructure and use essentially the same components as the modern classical communication equipment.
Over the recent years, immense progress has been made in our ability to analyze the security and performance of quantum key distribution protocols and their optical implementation. Initially the focus was on QKD technology that requires technology able to detect single photons, the smallest amount of light detectable. More recently, QKD systems based on modern homodyne and heterodyne detection technology were developed which use standard optical detection schemes as they are used in modern optical communication. No single-photon detection is required for these protocols, opening potentially the path for cheaper and faster QKD schemes. However, while some idealized situations of these protocols can now be readily analyzed, some desirable protocols, so called discrete-modulated continuous variable protocols, have resisted yet a full security analysis due to missing security proof techniques. In this proposal we will be developing new tools and methods for security proofs that are applicable to these desirable protocols. Only with clear formulated security proofs will we be able to deploy the new schemes to secure our infrastructure.
