Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of British Columbia
$21,000.00
Competition, collaboration, and control of decision rights in supply chains
FY 2012-13
Summary
The management, coordination, and design of multi-firm supply chains are topics of interest to industrial engineers, operations and supply chain managers, and economists. Traditionally, research in this area has focused on the optimal control of operational decisions such as the management of inventories in a supply chain. The methodology used has relied heavily on optimization theory. In the last decade new research has augmented this literature by incorporating the issue of incentives. This additional focus is supported by game theory, and recognizes the fact that all supply chains consist of multiple independent decision makers and individual decision makers maximize their self-interest.
Both approaches are important to help identify and eliminate supply chain inefficiencies but each implicitly assumes that the structure of the supply chain is predetermined; either a centralized decision maker exists, or multiple decision makers exist. In addition, the models assume that the control of supply chain decisions is predetermined. For example, in a typical supply chain model, a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer and the retailer makes the inventory decision while the manufacturer specifies the contract. In reality, the structure of the supply chain and the allocation of supply chain decision rights are themselves decision variables. In the above example, the firms may choose to vertically integrate thereby converting a decentralized supply chain to a centralized one. Even if the structure of the supply chain is unchanged, the allocation of decision rights may be modified and the manufacturer, for example, may be making the inventory decision.
This NSERC research proposal will explore issues related to the structure of supply chains, and the allocation of decision rights in these chains. Specifically, the research proposed here will investigate: 1) who owns and controls inventory decisions in a supply chain, and why; 2) who controls the logistics function in a supply chain and what are the implications of this control; 3) what incentives can be put in place to encourage competitors in a supply chain to collaborate; and 4) how can collaboration be maintained among competitors?
Program
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Recipient
Location
British Columbia, Canada
Recipient Type
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
As published
Application id
262670-2011
Name nom
Krishnan, Harish
Department département
Sauder School of Business
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2012
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
21000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1509
Committee name en
Civil, Industrial and Systems Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie civil, industriel et des systèmes
Area of application code
520
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Production and operations management
Area of application fr
Production et gestion des opérations
Research subject code
1600
Research subject group en
Industrial engineering
Research subject group fr
Génie industriel
Research subject en
Industrial engineering
Research subject fr
Génie industriel
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Competition, collaboration, and control of decision rights in supply chains
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The management, coordination, and design of multi-firm supply chains are topics of interest to industrial engineers, operations and supply chain managers, and economists. Traditionally, research in this area has focused on the optimal control of operational decisions such as the management of inventories in a supply chain. The methodology used has relied heavily on optimization theory. In the last decade new research has augmented this literature by incorporating the issue of incentives. This additional focus is supported by game theory, and recognizes the fact that all supply chains consist of multiple independent decision makers and individual decision makers maximize their self-interest.
Both approaches are important to help identify and eliminate supply chain inefficiencies but each implicitly assumes that the structure of the supply chain is predetermined; either a centralized decision maker exists, or multiple decision makers exist. In addition, the models assume that the control of supply chain decisions is predetermined. For example, in a typical supply chain model, a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer and the retailer makes the inventory decision while the manufacturer specifies the contract. In reality, the structure of the supply chain and the allocation of supply chain decision rights are themselves decision variables. In the above example, the firms may choose to vertically integrate thereby converting a decentralized supply chain to a centralized one. Even if the structure of the supply chain is unchanged, the allocation of decision rights may be modified and the manufacturer, for example, may be making the inventory decision.
This NSERC research proposal will explore issues related to the structure of supply chains, and the allocation of decision rights in these chains. Specifically, the research proposed here will investigate: 1) who owns and controls inventory decisions in a supply chain, and why; 2) who controls the logistics function in a supply chain and what are the implications of this control; 3) what incentives can be put in place to encourage competitors in a supply chain to collaborate; and 4) how can collaboration be maintained among competitors?