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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Alberta

$78,000.00

Algorithmic Prediction of Human Strategic Behaviour

EF 2024-25

Résumé
Settings in which participants reason strategically are widespread in artificial intelligence; they include any system that interacts with a human. These range from systems with large numbers of participants accounting for billions of dollars in transactions, such as ad auctions and radio spectrum allocation, to interactions with just a few participants, such as computer games or intelligent user interfaces. Regardless of the scale of such a system for interacting with humans, alternative designs must be evaluated either by trying each one out--frequently a very expensive and time-consuming proposition--or via their predicted performance based on a model of how participants will react to them. Hence, accurate behavioural models are valuable tools for improving both the design of agents and the design of the systems themselves. One possible candidate for such a model is game theory, the standard mathematical framework for understanding strategic interactions. However, it has been demonstrated from experimental data that standard game theoretic models describe human behaviour poorly. This inadequacy stems from their assumption that participants are perfectly rational agents. However, thanks to algorithmic advances and increased computing power and data availability, we now have the ability to go beyond the classical economic rationality assumptions to accurately predict actual human behaviour. The proposed research will develop substantially stronger models by taking realistic domain-specific problem structure into account. The realism to be considered will include: participants with large action sets; reasoning about large sets of other participants; receiving and learning from feedback as they interact with a system; reasoning about the learning of other participants. I will build on my previous work to construct models that predict behaviour in these richer environments. I will focus on two kinds of strategic interactions. The first is interactions with humans in relatively fixed environments. The specific domains will be allocation of security resources for malware and fraud detection, more realistic play in games, and optimal traffic advice. The other kind of interaction is the design of policies and incentives for coordinating the behaviour of multiple people, with a focus on the design of peer grading incentives that cannot be "gamed". The second problem of designing the strategic environment itself is referred to as mechanism design, and it is an increasingly important area of algorithmic game theory. There is a great opportunity for behaviourally informed mechanism design, as existing work is still very tied to the full rationality model.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Alberta, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
RGPIN-2019-04274
Name nom
Wright, James
Department département
Computing Science
Organization id
9
Institution établissement
University of Alberta
Province en
Alberta
Province fr
Alberta
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2024
Competition year année de concours
2019
Award amount
78000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
802
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Information systems and technology
Area of application fr
Systèmes d'information et technologie de l'information
Research subject code
2805
Research subject group en
Artificial intelligence
Research subject group fr
Intelligence artificielle
Research subject en
Learning and inference theories
Research subject fr
Théories de l'apprentissage et l'inférence
Field of research list names en
Not available
Field of research list names fr
Non disponible
Socioeconomic objective list names en
Not available
Socioeconomic objective list names fr
Non disponible
Application title
Algorithmic Prediction of Human Strategic Behaviour
Keywords
algorithmic economics; machine learning; deep learning; algorithmic game theory; behavioural game theory; behavioural economics; behavioural modelling; artificial intelligence; mechanism design
Application summary
Settings in which participants reason strategically are widespread in artificial intelligence; they include any system that interacts with a human. These range from systems with large numbers of participants accounting for billions of dollars in transactions, such as ad auctions and radio spectrum allocation, to interactions with just a few participants, such as computer games or intelligent user interfaces. Regardless of the scale of such a system for interacting with humans, alternative designs must be evaluated either by trying each one out--frequently a very expensive and time-consuming proposition--or via their predicted performance based on a model of how participants will react to them. Hence, accurate behavioural models are valuable tools for improving both the design of agents and the design of the systems themselves. One possible candidate for such a model is game theory, the standard mathematical framework for understanding strategic interactions. However, it has been demonstrated from experimental data that standard game theoretic models describe human behaviour poorly. This inadequacy stems from their assumption that participants are perfectly rational agents. However, thanks to algorithmic advances and increased computing power and data availability, we now have the ability to go beyond the classical economic rationality assumptions to accurately predict actual human behaviour. The proposed research will develop substantially stronger models by taking realistic domain-specific problem structure into account. The realism to be considered will include: participants with large action sets; reasoning about large sets of other participants; receiving and learning from feedback as they interact with a system; reasoning about the learning of other participants. I will build on my previous work to construct models that predict behaviour in these richer environments. I will focus on two kinds of strategic interactions. The first is interactions with humans in relatively fixed environments. The specific domains will be allocation of security resources for malware and fraud detection, more realistic play in games, and optimal traffic advice. The other kind of interaction is the design of policies and incentives for coordinating the behaviour of multiple people, with a focus on the design of peer grading incentives that cannot be "gamed". The second problem of designing the strategic environment itself is referred to as mechanism design, and it is an increasingly important area of algorithmic game theory. There is a great opportunity for behaviourally informed mechanism design, as existing work is still very tied to the full rationality model.