Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Carleton University
$28,000.00
Side-Channel Secure Designs and Implementations of Cryptographic Algorithms in Embedded Systems
EF 2023-24
Résumé
The widespread deployment of embedded systems and the Internet of Things (IoT), in our homes, cars, workplaces, manufacturing lines, hospitals, and power plants rely critically on their secure operation. Although the underlying mathematical foundations of the popular cryptographic algorithms are sound and well-understood, their actual realizations as cryptographic chips are not secure. Recent research has shown that the typical implementations of cryptographic algorithms can leak sensitive information through several side and covert channels. These channels include variations in the power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, execution time, photonic emissions, acoustic waves, response to induced faults, along with others. This group of attacks is called Implementation Attacks, where the adversary exploits weaknesses in the underlying implementation of a cryptographic algorithm rather than its mathematical structure. Implementation Attacks can be passive (known as Side-Channel Analysis) or active (known as Fault Attacks). The proposed research program seeks a deeper and more quantified understanding of side channel analysis and implementation attacks against critical embedded and IoT systems and proposes novel design methodologies and robust implementations that are secured against these attacks without violating usability, cost or real-time constraints. The objectives of this program include: 1- Building a fair, uniform and standardized evaluation platform for the analysis and quantification of information leakage in the cryptographic chips of embedded and IoT systems. This evaluation platform is essential not only to the security assessment of the new designs and implementations to be proposed in this research program, but also to analyze cryptographic chips used by government services and the industry. 2- Proposing new, more efficient, implementations of the currently used standard cryptographic algorithms. This is an ongoing research topic, where all the current implementations, both in hardware and software, are being rebuilt to incorporate security against implementation attacks. 3- Developing secure implementations for the new Quantum Resistant Cryptography (QRC), also called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), as a research goal of the Government of Canada. Currently, there are 26 new PQC algorithms that are being evaluated, each with several target security levels. These algorithms need to be analyzed within the framework of implementation attacks, and secure implementations need to be proposed. 4- Proposing novel design methodologies toward having new cryptographic algorithms that are side-channel-aware. In this research objective, we will propose tools to prevent information leakage in the design phase of new algorithms, rather than addressing the problem as an aftermath. This research program is multidisciplinary as it overlaps between science and engineering fields.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
Tel que publié
Application id
RGPIN-2020-06492
Name nom
Taha, Mostafa
Department département
Systems and Computer Engineering
Organization id
23
Institution établissement
Carleton University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2023
Competition year année de concours
2020
Award amount
28000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1510
Committee name en
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Committee name fr
Génie électrique et informatique
Area of application code
514
Area of application group en
Manufacturing processes and products
Area of application group fr
Procédés et produits industriels
Area of application en
Communications equipment
Area of application fr
Matériel de télécommunications
Research subject code
2504
Research subject group en
Electrical and electronic engineering
Research subject group fr
Integrated circuits
Research subject en
Génie électrique et électronique
Research subject fr
Circuits intégrés
Application title
Side-Channel Secure Designs and Implementations of Cryptographic Algorithms in Embedded Systems
Keyword
Covert Information Channel Attacks; Implementation Attacks; Information Leakage Verification and Quantization; Robust Key-Updating Mechanisms; Secure Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms; Secure Implementation of PQC Algorithms; Security of Embedded and IoT Systems; Side-Channel Analysis; Side-Channel Aware Designs; Threshold Implementations, Leakage Resiliency
Application summary
The widespread deployment of embedded systems and the Internet of Things (IoT), in our homes, cars, workplaces, manufacturing lines, hospitals, and power plants rely critically on their secure operation. Although the underlying mathematical foundations of the popular cryptographic algorithms are sound and well-understood, their actual realizations as cryptographic chips are not secure. Recent research has shown that the typical implementations of cryptographic algorithms can leak sensitive information through several side and covert channels. These channels include variations in the power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, execution time, photonic emissions, acoustic waves, response to induced faults, along with others. This group of attacks is called Implementation Attacks, where the adversary exploits weaknesses in the underlying implementation of a cryptographic algorithm rather than its mathematical structure. Implementation Attacks can be passive (known as Side-Channel Analysis) or active (known as Fault Attacks). The proposed research program seeks a deeper and more quantified understanding of side channel analysis and implementation attacks against critical embedded and IoT systems and proposes novel design methodologies and robust implementations that are secured against these attacks without violating usability, cost or real-time constraints. The objectives of this program include: 1- Building a fair, uniform and standardized evaluation platform for the analysis and quantification of information leakage in the cryptographic chips of embedded and IoT systems. This evaluation platform is essential not only to the security assessment of the new designs and implementations to be proposed in this research program, but also to analyze cryptographic chips used by government services and the industry. 2- Proposing new, more efficient, implementations of the currently used standard cryptographic algorithms. This is an ongoing research topic, where all the current implementations, both in hardware and software, are being rebuilt to incorporate security against implementation attacks. 3- Developing secure implementations for the new Quantum Resistant Cryptography (QRC), also called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), as a research goal of the Government of Canada. Currently, there are 26 new PQC algorithms that are being evaluated, each with several target security levels. These algorithms need to be analyzed within the framework of implementation attacks, and secure implementations need to be proposed. 4- Proposing novel design methodologies toward having new cryptographic algorithms that are side-channel-aware. In this research objective, we will propose tools to prevent information leakage in the design phase of new algorithms, rather than addressing the problem as an aftermath. This research program is multidisciplinary as it overlaps between science and engineering fields.