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Grant: Research Tools and Instruments - Category 1 (<$150,000)

École Polytechnique de Montréal

$43,919.00

Network security in electrical control networks

EF 2009-10

Résumé
SCADA networks are the backbone of most our critical infrastructure, allowing their operators to monitor and control the various components of their systems. They provide a link between sensors and the centralized computer control systems that interpret, warn and in some cases automatically control parts of the infrastructure by sending commands on that same network to SCADA-aware actuators. The availability and integrity of the data captured and sent on these networks is absolutely fundamental to the safe and reliable operation of our critical infrastructure. Nowadays, SCADA sensory data and commands transit over computer networks much like those that have become common place in businesses and the Internet. In fact, SCADA networks often piggy back on or are connected to these corporate networks and even to the Internet in order to facilitate remote management, unfortunately exposing them to many of the same threats. The security of computer networks in their traditional and most common uses (electronic commerce, corporate information systems, Web, email, etc.) has been widely studied, and the consequence of threats such as Denial-of-Service attacks and computer hacking is well understood and is typically measured in terms of loss of availability or other quality of service metrics. However, there has been relatively little research done on the quantitative impact on the critical infrastructure of the same threats to the computer systems that control them. In this project, we study this problem in the case of electrical power grid control networks. The equipment acquired with this grant will allow us to reproduce in the lab the behaviour of the electrical grid when we subject the control networks to various kinds of probable and realistic computer network attacks or disruptive events. In particular, it will allow us to measure and model their impact in terms of electrical power delivered to customers (or lack thereof) rather than in the traditional measures of network quality of service (e.g. loss of bandwith, latency, etc.). This will eventually allow electrical grid operators to determine how to best configure and protect their control computer networks in order to minimise impact on their customers.
Programme
Research Tools and Instruments - Category 1 (<$150,000)
Emplacement
Quebec, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
390374-2010
Name nom
Fernandez, JoseManuel
Department département
Génie informatique et génie logiciel
Organization id
64
Institution établissement
École Polytechnique de Montréal
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2009
Competition year année de concours
2010
Award amount
43919
Program id
EQPEQ
Program nane en
Research Tools and Instruments - Category 1 (<$150,000)
Program name fr
Outils et instruments de recherche - catégorie 1 (<150 000$)
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
304
Area of application group en
Energy resources
Area of application group fr
Ressources d'énergie
Area of application en
Electrical energy
Area of application fr
Énergie électrique
Research subject code
2700
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Information technology
Research subject fr
Technologie de l'information
Partie
1
Nb partie
1
Application title
Network security in electrical control networks
Keyword
NA
Application summary
SCADA networks are the backbone of most our critical infrastructure, allowing their operators to monitor and control the various components of their systems. They provide a link between sensors and the centralized computer control systems that interpret, warn and in some cases automatically control parts of the infrastructure by sending commands on that same network to SCADA-aware actuators. The availability and integrity of the data captured and sent on these networks is absolutely fundamental to the safe and reliable operation of our critical infrastructure. Nowadays, SCADA sensory data and commands transit over computer networks much like those that have become common place in businesses and the Internet. In fact, SCADA networks often piggy back on or are connected to these corporate networks and even to the Internet in order to facilitate remote management, unfortunately exposing them to many of the same threats. The security of computer networks in their traditional and most common uses (electronic commerce, corporate information systems, Web, email, etc.) has been widely studied, and the consequence of threats such as Denial-of-Service attacks and computer hacking is well understood and is typically measured in terms of loss of availability or other quality of service metrics. However, there has been relatively little research done on the quantitative impact on the critical infrastructure of the same threats to the computer systems that control them. In this project, we study this problem in the case of electrical power grid control networks. The equipment acquired with this grant will allow us to reproduce in the lab the behaviour of the electrical grid when we subject the control networks to various kinds of probable and realistic computer network attacks or disruptive events. In particular, it will allow us to measure and model their impact in terms of electrical power delivered to customers (or lack thereof) rather than in the traditional measures of network quality of service (e.g. loss of bandwith, latency, etc.). This will eventually allow electrical grid operators to determine how to best configure and protect their control computer networks in order to minimise impact on their customers.