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Grant: Collaborative Research and Development Grants

University of Toronto

$70,000.00

Computational tools for analyzing and detecting software supply chain attacks

EF 2016-17

Résumé
Software supply chain attacks -- attacks where malware is covertly inserted into reputable and otherwise benign software somewhere in the chain between development and final use by the customer have become a growing concern. With the potential to affect enterprises, public organizations and individual users, supply chain attacks are a threat to users of every kind. Traditional defenses, such as anti-virus scanners are largely ineffective as the malware deposited by these attacks are often custom crafted and can be stealthily embedded in code that is normally highly trusted by the end user. In this collaborative project, we will address this threat by investigating and designing new code analysis techniques that can detect and identify software supply chain attacks. Traditional malware detection techniques needed to be cheap enough to run on each machine, limiting them to fairly cheap syntactic, signature-based detection mechanisms that did little to try to understand the behavior of the code it was scanning. However, the large amounts of easily available parallel computing power found in cloud computing services, combined with the broad availability of fast network connectivity, motivates an approach where code analysis techniques can be applied centrally and then the results are disseminated to all end hosts. This opens the door to very computationally intensive, but powerful static and dynamic analysis techniques which, instead of merely seeking to detect if the code matches some a previously known signature, seeks instead to understand and analyze the potential behavior of an untrusted piece of software to see if it harbors any malicious intent.
Programme
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
474601-2014
Name nom
Lie, David
Department département
Electrical & Computer Engineering
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2016
Competition year année de concours
2014
Award amount
70000
Program id
CRDPJ
Program name en
Collaborative Research and Development Grants
Program name fr
Subventions de recherche et développement coopérative
Group en
Research partnerships programs
Group fr
Programmes de partenariat
Committee code
96
Committee name en
RPP Internal Decision Cttee
Committee name fr
Cté de décision interne - PPR
Area of application code
801
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer software
Area of application fr
Logiciel
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
2
Nb partie
3
Application title
Computational tools for analyzing and detecting software supply chain attacks
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
Software supply chain attacks -- attacks where malware is covertly inserted into reputable and otherwise benign software somewhere in the chain between development and final use by the customer have become a growing concern. With the potential to affect enterprises, public organizations and individual users, supply chain attacks are a threat to users of every kind. Traditional defenses, such as anti-virus scanners are largely ineffective as the malware deposited by these attacks are often custom crafted and can be stealthily embedded in code that is normally highly trusted by the end user. In this collaborative project, we will address this threat by investigating and designing new code analysis techniques that can detect and identify software supply chain attacks. Traditional malware detection techniques needed to be cheap enough to run on each machine, limiting them to fairly cheap syntactic, signature-based detection mechanisms that did little to try to understand the behavior of the code it was scanning. However, the large amounts of easily available parallel computing power found in cloud computing services, combined with the broad availability of fast network connectivity, motivates an approach where code analysis techniques can be applied centrally and then the results are disseminated to all end hosts. This opens the door to very computationally intensive, but powerful static and dynamic analysis techniques which, instead of merely seeking to detect if the code matches some a previously known signature, seeks instead to understand and analyze the potential behavior of an untrusted piece of software to see if it harbors any malicious intent.