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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Toronto

$25,000.00

Language and meta-representation in the development of false-belief understanding

EF 2011-12

Résumé
This project examines children's understanding of human action. For example, when do children understand that people sometimes act mistakenly on the basis of wrong information? To find out, children are told a story in which a boy leaves an object in one place and goes away. While he's gone the object is moved to another place, and later he comes back to look for it. Numerous studies have shown that about 4 years of age, children expect that the boy will look in the first location because that's where he thinks the object is. But 3-year-olds say the boy will look in the new location. They don't understand that beliefs guide actions and the boy has a ""false belief"" about the object's location. However, recently, using more indirect testing methods, psychologists have shown that babies and toddlers have some ""implicit"" understanding of false belief. For example, babies are surprised and look longer at a video scene when a person with a false belief searches in the new location. And when toddlers are prompted to anticipate the search of a person with a false belief, their eyes glance towards the old location where the person thinks it is. In this project we will investigate the thinking skills that underlie the transition from implicit to explicit understanding of false belief, as seen in the story task. Our first study will determine whether success on the story task is solely dependent on children's ability to resist giving an immediate answer about where the object actually is, or whether it also depends on their ability to represent their own and another person's different perspectives on the same situation. In the second study we will use a training methodology to examine how language may help children develop an explicit understanding of false belief. Using multiple videos, children will be trained to associate someone's making a mistake with the word ""think"" (e.g., ""He thinks it's in there""), or with a nonsense word, or with a nonverbal sound, and then they will be tested to see what they have learned. This study will show whether children need an explicit ""language of thinking"" in order to understand false belief and to represent their own and another person's different perspectives on the same situation.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
107626-2010
Name nom
Astington, Janet
Department département
Human Development and Applied Psychology
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2011
Competition year année de concours
2010
Award amount
25000
Program id
RGPIN
Program nane en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1200
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application fr
Avancement des connaissances
Research subject code
6305
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Cognitive science -- development
Research subject fr
Science cognitive -- développement
Partie
2
Nb partie
2
Application title
Language and meta-representation in the development of false-belief understanding
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
This project examines children's understanding of human action. For example, when do children understand that people sometimes act mistakenly on the basis of wrong information? To find out, children are told a story in which a boy leaves an object in one place and goes away. While he's gone the object is moved to another place, and later he comes back to look for it. Numerous studies have shown that about 4 years of age, children expect that the boy will look in the first location because that's where he thinks the object is. But 3-year-olds say the boy will look in the new location. They don't understand that beliefs guide actions and the boy has a ""false belief"" about the object's location. However, recently, using more indirect testing methods, psychologists have shown that babies and toddlers have some ""implicit"" understanding of false belief. For example, babies are surprised and look longer at a video scene when a person with a false belief searches in the new location. And when toddlers are prompted to anticipate the search of a person with a false belief, their eyes glance towards the old location where the person thinks it is. In this project we will investigate the thinking skills that underlie the transition from implicit to explicit understanding of false belief, as seen in the story task. Our first study will determine whether success on the story task is solely dependent on children's ability to resist giving an immediate answer about where the object actually is, or whether it also depends on their ability to represent their own and another person's different perspectives on the same situation. In the second study we will use a training methodology to examine how language may help children develop an explicit understanding of false belief. Using multiple videos, children will be trained to associate someone's making a mistake with the word ""think"" (e.g., ""He thinks it's in there""), or with a nonsense word, or with a nonverbal sound, and then they will be tested to see what they have learned. This study will show whether children need an explicit ""language of thinking"" in order to understand false belief and to represent their own and another person's different perspectives on the same situation.