Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of Calgary
$34,000.00
Supporting software security by measuring, coordinating, and enforcing software trustworthiness
EF 2012-13
Résumé
The public often has little guidance when selecting security software to defend their computers. What makes this problem so difficult is the lack of information on what specific parts of a computer system (and its software) various anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall software actually monitor and defend. Information security experts typically recommend multiple layers of defense (i.e., ""defense-in-depth""), but there is little concrete evidence for judging what software to pick or determining the makeup of those layers.
The key scientific issue here focuses on how to compose trust -- the notion that software will behave as expected -- in these systems. This work thus seeks to measure the composition of existing software protection mechanisms for how much of a computer they ""cover."" This work also proposes models for how to design security software to cooperate (rather than compete) because their competition typically results in unstable or crashing computers due to conflicting modifications. Pasting two or more security mechanisms together in the name of ""defense-in-depth"" and having them interact in unanticipated, counterproductive, or ultimately insecure ways does not seem very desirable.
Although this research examines fundamentally hard scientific problems like how to compose trust relationships in software, the work in this proposal will have a very practical outcome: enabling end-users and organizations to more clearly understand what their chosen collection of protection mechanisms provides.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Alberta, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
Tel que publié
Application id
402445-2011
Name nom
Locasto, Michael
Department département
Computer Science
Organization id
11
Institution établissement
University of Calgary
Province en
Alberta
Province fr
Alberta
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2012
Competition year année de concours
2011
Award amount
34000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
801
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer software
Area of application fr
Logiciel
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Supporting software security by measuring, coordinating, and enforcing software trustworthiness
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The public often has little guidance when selecting security software to defend their computers. What makes this problem so difficult is the lack of information on what specific parts of a computer system (and its software) various anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall software actually monitor and defend. Information security experts typically recommend multiple layers of defense (i.e., ""defense-in-depth""), but there is little concrete evidence for judging what software to pick or determining the makeup of those layers.
The key scientific issue here focuses on how to compose trust -- the notion that software will behave as expected -- in these systems. This work thus seeks to measure the composition of existing software protection mechanisms for how much of a computer they ""cover."" This work also proposes models for how to design security software to cooperate (rather than compete) because their competition typically results in unstable or crashing computers due to conflicting modifications. Pasting two or more security mechanisms together in the name of ""defense-in-depth"" and having them interact in unanticipated, counterproductive, or ultimately insecure ways does not seem very desirable.
Although this research examines fundamentally hard scientific problems like how to compose trust relationships in software, the work in this proposal will have a very practical outcome: enabling end-users and organizations to more clearly understand what their chosen collection of protection mechanisms provides.