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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Toronto

$22,000.00

Addressing internet security vulnerabilities

EF 2008-09

Résumé
An important problem that Internet users are facing today is their vulnerability to a variety of attacks and malicious programs. Although Internet computing has seen tumultuous change over the past decade, we are still relying on decade-old security mechanisms to protect Internet hosts. In the past, a few million early adopters occasionally dialed into the Internet, software was shrink-wrapped and purchased from stores, few applications used the network, and viruses were the dominant threat to end users.  Today, hundreds of millions of technologically unsophisticated users have permanent broadband Internet connections, they acquire and upgrade their software over the Internet, their applications depend on the network to function correctly, and as a result of all this, they must contend with spyware, worms, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and viruses. My long-term research objective is to make Internet user's desktops less vulnerable in the face of Internet attacks and malicious programs. We are planning to first address two problems in this area: the proliferation of spyware programs and the examination of the impact of Internet attacks to network traffic "bystanders". Spyware programs are software programs that collect information about a computer's use and relay it to a third party surreptitiously. Our approach is to create counterfeit information to such a large degree that we devalue the gathered information to the point that the incentive to collect it in the first place is eliminated. Internet attacks have received a great deal of interest from the research community. However, an essential aspect of these attacks has not been examined: their impact on ''bystanders'', that is users that are not directly targeted but happen to share the same infrastructure as the victims. We would like to quantify the extent of this problem and characterize current solutions from the perspective of network bystanders, rather than the victims. 1. The proliferation of spyware programs. Spyware programs are software programs that collect information about a computer's use and relay it to a third party. Spyware exists because the gathered information has value. This information is useful to vendors, Internet advertisers, as well as malicious entities. Although spyware is a recent addition to the growing list of Internet security problems, spyware poses many risks: it can compromise users' privacy, it can expose the infected host to additional security vulnerabilities, and it can degrade the performance of infected hosts. My previous research has characterized the spread of spyware within the University of Washington, a large organization with over 60,000 students, faculty, and staff. We propose a novel approach to address the proliferation of spyware: creating counterfeit information. This technique does not prevent spyware installations, nor does it recover from them; instead it focuses on decreasing the value of information spyware collects. While information about real users is valuable, counterfeit information is not. To be successful, our approach must generate enough counterfeit information to devalue the gathered information to the point that the incentive to collect it in the first place is eliminated. 2. Characterizing the impact of Internet worms and DoS attacks on network traffic bystanders. Current Internet attacks, such as worms and DoS attacks, have received a great deal of interest from the research community. However, an essential aspect of these attacks is currently poorly understood: their impact on ''bystanders'', that is users that are not directly targeted but happen to share the same infrastructure as the attacks. We believe that the frequency of worms and DoS attacks is so high that a large fraction of legitimate traffic is being affected by it, but masked by the network and applications congestion control mechanisms. We are interested in quantifying the extent of this problem and characterizing current solutions from the perspective of network bystanders, rather than the victims. We plan to develop a network tracing infrastructure to capture worms and DoS traffic. This new system will be deployed at the Internet border of a large user population (e.g., all Internet users at the University of Toronto) and it will observe all traffic flowing through the border. We plan to collect network traces of worms and DoS traffic and to analyze their impact on bystander traffic. Finally, we plan to investigate the differences of the network traffic characteristics in the presence of an Internet worm or DoS attack as well as in the absence of such attacks.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
327702-2006
Name nom
Saroiu, Stefan
Department département
Mathematical and Computational Sciences (Mississauga)
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2008
Competition year année de concours
2006
Award amount
22000
Program id
RGPIN
Program nane en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
330
Committee name en
Computing and Information Sciences - A
Committee name fr
Informatique - A
Area of application code
801
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Computer software
Area of application fr
Logiciel
Research subject code
2720
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Computer systems software
Research subject fr
Logiciel de systèmes informatiques
Partie
3
Nb partie
3
Application title
Addressing internet security vulnerabilities
Keyword
NA
Application summary
An important problem that Internet users are facing today is their vulnerability to a variety of attacks and malicious programs. Although Internet computing has seen tumultuous change over the past decade, we are still relying on decade-old security mechanisms to protect Internet hosts. In the past, a few million early adopters occasionally dialed into the Internet, software was shrink-wrapped and purchased from stores, few applications used the network, and viruses were the dominant threat to end users.  Today, hundreds of millions of technologically unsophisticated users have permanent broadband Internet connections, they acquire and upgrade their software over the Internet, their applications depend on the network to function correctly, and as a result of all this, they must contend with spyware, worms, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and viruses. My long-term research objective is to make Internet user's desktops less vulnerable in the face of Internet attacks and malicious programs. We are planning to first address two problems in this area: the proliferation of spyware programs and the examination of the impact of Internet attacks to network traffic "bystanders". Spyware programs are software programs that collect information about a computer's use and relay it to a third party surreptitiously. Our approach is to create counterfeit information to such a large degree that we devalue the gathered information to the point that the incentive to collect it in the first place is eliminated. Internet attacks have received a great deal of interest from the research community. However, an essential aspect of these attacks has not been examined: their impact on ''bystanders'', that is users that are not directly targeted but happen to share the same infrastructure as the victims. We would like to quantify the extent of this problem and characterize current solutions from the perspective of network bystanders, rather than the victims. 1. The proliferation of spyware programs. Spyware programs are software programs that collect information about a computer's use and relay it to a third party. Spyware exists because the gathered information has value. This information is useful to vendors, Internet advertisers, as well as malicious entities. Although spyware is a recent addition to the growing list of Internet security problems, spyware poses many risks: it can compromise users' privacy, it can expose the infected host to additional security vulnerabilities, and it can degrade the performance of infected hosts. My previous research has characterized the spread of spyware within the University of Washington, a large organization with over 60,000 students, faculty, and staff. We propose a novel approach to address the proliferation of spyware: creating counterfeit information. This technique does not prevent spyware installations, nor does it recover from them; instead it focuses on decreasing the value of information spyware collects. While information about real users is valuable, counterfeit information is not. To be successful, our approach must generate enough counterfeit information to devalue the gathered information to the point that the incentive to collect it in the first place is eliminated. 2. Characterizing the impact of Internet worms and DoS attacks on network traffic bystanders. Current Internet attacks, such as worms and DoS attacks, have received a great deal of interest from the research community. However, an essential aspect of these attacks is currently poorly understood: their impact on ''bystanders'', that is users that are not directly targeted but happen to share the same infrastructure as the attacks. We believe that the frequency of worms and DoS attacks is so high that a large fraction of legitimate traffic is being affected by it, but masked by the network and applications congestion control mechanisms. We are interested in quantifying the extent of this problem and characterizing current solutions from the perspective of network bystanders, rather than the victims. We plan to develop a network tracing infrastructure to capture worms and DoS traffic. This new system will be deployed at the Internet border of a large user population (e.g., all Internet users at the University of Toronto) and it will observe all traffic flowing through the border. We plan to collect network traces of worms and DoS traffic and to analyze their impact on bystander traffic. Finally, we plan to investigate the differences of the network traffic characteristics in the presence of an Internet worm or DoS attack as well as in the absence of such attacks.