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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

Brock University

$19,000.00

Principal-Agent Problems in Insurance Design

EF 2022-23

Résumé
Insurance (contract) design, including pricing and determining other contractual terms, is a topic of central importance in actuarial science. Conventionally, it is common to design a contract from the perspective of insurers to achieve certain business objectives, and insureds' objectives are often ignored. The resulting contracts would lead to welfare losses to insureds, whose behavior may in turn adversely affect the welfare of insurers. A more efficient contract design procedure hence would account for the objectives of both contracting parties. This becomes particularly important when insureds have the ability to affect the outcome of the insured events through private actions (e.g., surrender, withdrawal) that are not controllable by insurers and/or possess hidden information (e.g., risk type, risk preference) that is unknown to insurers, both of which are ubiquitous across today's insurance markets. The primary objective of the proposed research is to investigate optimal insurance designs through principal-agent problems, a game theoretic framework that accounts for the interactions between insurer and insured, and generates insurance contracts endogenously in equilibrium. The research will be carried out in variable annuity markets, secondary life insurance markets, and for general insurance. The complex financial structure for insurance policies will lead to cutting-edge principal-agent problems, solving which will contribute to the literature of stochastic control theory. The resulting contracts are expected to reduce inefficiencies in insurance contracting and to better align theoretic predictions with market observations. Academics and practitioners are expected to benefit from the deep insight into interactions in insurance contracting. In the long run, the equilibria are expected to serve as drivers of financial innovations in modern insurance markets, which potentially induce market expansions. Graduate students and undergraduate students will be involved in the proposed research projects and receive high-quality training. A significant number of research papers are expected to be published in top actuarial science and mathematical finance journals over the course of the grant.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
RGPIN-2022-04958
Name nom
Li, Dongchen
Department département
Mathematics & Statistics - Mathematics & Statistics
Organization id
22
Institution établissement
Brock University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2022
Competition year année de concours
2022
Award amount
19000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1508
Committee name en
Mathematics and Statistics
Committee name fr
Mathématiques et statistique
Area of application code
1205
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Mathematical sciences
Area of application fr
Sciences mathématiques
Research subject code
2950
Research subject group en
Applied mathematics
Research subject group fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Research subject en
Applied mathematics
Research subject fr
Mathématiques appliquées
Installment
inst:1
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
Principal-Agent Problems in Insurance Design
Application summary
Insurance (contract) design, including pricing and determining other contractual terms, is a topic of central importance in actuarial science. Conventionally, it is common to design a contract from the perspective of insurers to achieve certain business objectives, and insureds' objectives are often ignored. The resulting contracts would lead to welfare losses to insureds, whose behavior may in turn adversely affect the welfare of insurers. A more efficient contract design procedure hence would account for the objectives of both contracting parties. This becomes particularly important when insureds have the ability to affect the outcome of the insured events through private actions (e.g., surrender, withdrawal) that are not controllable by insurers and/or possess hidden information (e.g., risk type, risk preference) that is unknown to insurers, both of which are ubiquitous across today's insurance markets. The primary objective of the proposed research is to investigate optimal insurance designs through principal-agent problems, a game theoretic framework that accounts for the interactions between insurer and insured, and generates insurance contracts endogenously in equilibrium. The research will be carried out in variable annuity markets, secondary life insurance markets, and for general insurance. The complex financial structure for insurance policies will lead to cutting-edge principal-agent problems, solving which will contribute to the literature of stochastic control theory. The resulting contracts are expected to reduce inefficiencies in insurance contracting and to better align theoretic predictions with market observations. Academics and practitioners are expected to benefit from the deep insight into interactions in insurance contracting. In the long run, the equilibria are expected to serve as drivers of financial innovations in modern insurance markets, which potentially induce market expansions. Graduate students and undergraduate students will be involved in the proposed research projects and receive high-quality training. A significant number of research papers are expected to be published in top actuarial science and mathematical finance journals over the course of the grant.