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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

University of Toronto

$30,000.00

Think fast! The role of automaticity in the cognitive control of action

EF 2018-19

Résumé
The study of human cognition has traditionally focused on executive control and performance monitoring - processes that require memory, attention and mental effort. However, our everyday life consists of a wide repertoire of behaviors that proceed automatically with little conscious guidance, and there has been a long-standing interest in the role of ""automaticity"" in cognitive control and action. Dual-process theories of higher brain function posit two separate cognitive systems - one conscious and reflective, the other automatic and reflexive - which guide our decisions and actions. These two types of control are likely regulated by different cortical networks, which must seamlessly interact under competing demands of rapid responding and selection of appropriate responses. Similarly, error detection is often a rapid and highly automatic process, yet conscious awareness of our errors is critical in learning and reinforcement of appropriate behaviors. Laboratory tasks involving rapid motor responses to unexpected events can reveal many aspects of cognitive control, but to date have not precisely revealed how and when transitions between these two types of control occur. In previous research, we have shown that automatic and controlled processes were activated in parallel during tasks requiring rapid responding and inhibition, and that responses associated with decreased conscious control were not always associated with decreased performance. Furthermore, several studies have shown that improvements in task performance are associated with decreased response variability, rather than response slowing. This has led us to the general hypothesis that improved performance (e.g., better inhibitory control) is closely related to optimal shifting between controlled and automatic processing, rather than increasing executive (top-down) control. *In the proposed research, we will use MEG functional imaging of brain activity during rapid motor response tasks in order to reveal the temporal organization of neural activity that indexes periods of automatic responding, and intrusions of controlled processes during rapid response selection and error processing. We will use a novel combination of kinematic measures and MEG to measure brain activity during goal-directed (reaching) tasks to separate cortical activity related to response selection, initiation, and inhibitory control, and identify specific time points at which controlled processing overrides automatic responses. We will also examine the relationship between periods of automatic responding or off-task mental states and activation of brain networks associated with internalized thought (e.g., ""default-mode"") during both successful response switching and failed inhibition. This will be achieved using established methods such as self-report probe trials, in addition to unique measures of pupil diameter as an index of fluctuations in attentional control. These studies will allow us to determine whether, in addition to attentional lapses leading to performance errors, such brain states can also reflect periods of accurate performance with minimal executive control, and further, whether there are differences in brain responses signaling early (unconscious) error detection and post-error adjustments during periods of varying automatic control. In a final phase of the project, we plan to adapt our response inhibition tasks to studies in children, with the goal of studying the maturation of controlled and automatic processing with development. This will enhance our understanding of both normal cognitive development and deficits of cognitive control prevalent in many developmental disorders, and provide novel insights into the role of automaticity in human behavior across the lifespan.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
RGPIN-2014-04120
Name nom
Cheyne, Douglas
Department département
Neurosciences & Mental Health - Neurosciences & Mental Health
Organization id
31
Institution établissement
University of Toronto
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2018
Competition year année de concours
2014
Award amount
30000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1201
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Life sciences (including biotechnology)
Area of application fr
Sciences de la vie (y compris biotechnologie)
Research subject code
6311
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Motor systems and performance
Research subject fr
Systèmes moteurs et performance
Partie
5
Nb partie
5
Application title
Think fast! The role of automaticity in the cognitive control of action
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
The study of human cognition has traditionally focused on executive control and performance monitoring - processes that require memory, attention and mental effort. However, our everyday life consists of a wide repertoire of behaviors that proceed automatically with little conscious guidance, and there has been a long-standing interest in the role of ""automaticity"" in cognitive control and action. Dual-process theories of higher brain function posit two separate cognitive systems - one conscious and reflective, the other automatic and reflexive - which guide our decisions and actions. These two types of control are likely regulated by different cortical networks, which must seamlessly interact under competing demands of rapid responding and selection of appropriate responses. Similarly, error detection is often a rapid and highly automatic process, yet conscious awareness of our errors is critical in learning and reinforcement of appropriate behaviors. Laboratory tasks involving rapid motor responses to unexpected events can reveal many aspects of cognitive control, but to date have not precisely revealed how and when transitions between these two types of control occur. In previous research, we have shown that automatic and controlled processes were activated in parallel during tasks requiring rapid responding and inhibition, and that responses associated with decreased conscious control were not always associated with decreased performance. Furthermore, several studies have shown that improvements in task performance are associated with decreased response variability, rather than response slowing. This has led us to the general hypothesis that improved performance (e.g., better inhibitory control) is closely related to optimal shifting between controlled and automatic processing, rather than increasing executive (top-down) control. *In the proposed research, we will use MEG functional imaging of brain activity during rapid motor response tasks in order to reveal the temporal organization of neural activity that indexes periods of automatic responding, and intrusions of controlled processes during rapid response selection and error processing. We will use a novel combination of kinematic measures and MEG to measure brain activity during goal-directed (reaching) tasks to separate cortical activity related to response selection, initiation, and inhibitory control, and identify specific time points at which controlled processing overrides automatic responses. We will also examine the relationship between periods of automatic responding or off-task mental states and activation of brain networks associated with internalized thought (e.g., ""default-mode"") during both successful response switching and failed inhibition. This will be achieved using established methods such as self-report probe trials, in addition to unique measures of pupil diameter as an index of fluctuations in attentional control. These studies will allow us to determine whether, in addition to attentional lapses leading to performance errors, such brain states can also reflect periods of accurate performance with minimal executive control, and further, whether there are differences in brain responses signaling early (unconscious) error detection and post-error adjustments during periods of varying automatic control. In a final phase of the project, we plan to adapt our response inhibition tasks to studies in children, with the goal of studying the maturation of controlled and automatic processing with development. This will enhance our understanding of both normal cognitive development and deficits of cognitive control prevalent in many developmental disorders, and provide novel insights into the role of automaticity in human behavior across the lifespan.