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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

Université du Québec à Montréal

$33,000.00

The dual strategy model of reason: Integrating counterexample and probabilistic reasoning

EF 2022-23

Résumé
Reasoning involves making inferences on the basis of given premises and is an important component of advanced cognition. Unfortunately, research has shown that people have real problems being "logical" and often make illogical inferences. Currently, there are two major models of how people reason, mental model theories and probabilistic theories, which suggest very different underlying processes and mechanisms. However, the latest work from my lab suggests that a hybrid model of reasoning, the Dual strategy model, could potentially integrate these various approaches. This model suggests that each of these theories might represent a different form of reasoning strategy, and identifies two such strategies. Counterexample reasoners make inferences by constructing representations of key aspects of a given problem and are sensitive to potential counterexamples. Statistical reasoners use intuitive access to information in order to generate likelihood estimates of possible conclusions. Several studies, using a previously elaborated diagnostic instrument, suggest that people preferentially use one of these two forms of reasoning strategy. This predicts individual differences on a wide variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. This program will continue to examine this model in more detail, in order to provide a stronger empirical base and to determine with more precision what dimensions characterize the strategy distinction. A first set of studies will examine effects of time constraints on reasoning. Previous results suggest that Statistical reasoners are using a complex form of rapid, intuitive processing, which should be relatively impervious to time constraints, while Counterexample reasoners use more working memory intensive processes for which thinking fast should be less logical than thinking slow. A second series of studies are derived from some preliminary results that suggests that Counterexample reasoners are more focused on a restricted subset of available information while Statistical reasoners are more diffuse and attend to a larger array of information, but in a less focused way. This will be examined in a set of correlational studies using both standard and non-standard measures of attention. A third series of studies will examine the potential implications of differing strategy use on academic performance in children. A recent study with adults has shown that strategy use predicts performance over and above cognitive capacity. This suggests that differences in strategy use could be important tool in understanding differences in the underlying way that children and adolescents process academic information. The Dual strategy model of reasoning has shown that it taps into a major distinction in the way that people think, one which has the potential to change our understanding of the variability in human reasoning. The proposed studies will delve deeper into the cognitive, attentional and developmental components of this distinction.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Emplacement
Quebec, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
RGPIN-2022-03310
Name nom
Markovits, Henry
Department département
Psychologie - Psychologie
Organization id
57
Institution établissement
Université du Québec à Montréal
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2022
Competition year année de concours
2022
Award amount
33000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1502
Committee name en
Biological Systems and Functions
Committee name fr
Systèmes et fonctions biologiques
Area of application code
1200
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application fr
Avancement des connaissances
Research subject code
6300
Research subject group en
Psychology
Research subject group fr
Psychologie
Research subject en
Psychology
Research subject fr
Psychologie
Installment
inst:1
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
The dual strategy model of reason: Integrating counterexample and probabilistic reasoning
Application summary
Reasoning involves making inferences on the basis of given premises and is an important component of advanced cognition. Unfortunately, research has shown that people have real problems being "logical" and often make illogical inferences. Currently, there are two major models of how people reason, mental model theories and probabilistic theories, which suggest very different underlying processes and mechanisms. However, the latest work from my lab suggests that a hybrid model of reasoning, the Dual strategy model, could potentially integrate these various approaches. This model suggests that each of these theories might represent a different form of reasoning strategy, and identifies two such strategies. Counterexample reasoners make inferences by constructing representations of key aspects of a given problem and are sensitive to potential counterexamples. Statistical reasoners use intuitive access to information in order to generate likelihood estimates of possible conclusions. Several studies, using a previously elaborated diagnostic instrument, suggest that people preferentially use one of these two forms of reasoning strategy. This predicts individual differences on a wide variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. This program will continue to examine this model in more detail, in order to provide a stronger empirical base and to determine with more precision what dimensions characterize the strategy distinction. A first set of studies will examine effects of time constraints on reasoning. Previous results suggest that Statistical reasoners are using a complex form of rapid, intuitive processing, which should be relatively impervious to time constraints, while Counterexample reasoners use more working memory intensive processes for which thinking fast should be less logical than thinking slow. A second series of studies are derived from some preliminary results that suggests that Counterexample reasoners are more focused on a restricted subset of available information while Statistical reasoners are more diffuse and attend to a larger array of information, but in a less focused way. This will be examined in a set of correlational studies using both standard and non-standard measures of attention. A third series of studies will examine the potential implications of differing strategy use on academic performance in children. A recent study with adults has shown that strategy use predicts performance over and above cognitive capacity. This suggests that differences in strategy use could be important tool in understanding differences in the underlying way that children and adolescents process academic information. The Dual strategy model of reasoning has shown that it taps into a major distinction in the way that people think, one which has the potential to change our understanding of the variability in human reasoning. The proposed studies will delve deeper into the cognitive, attentional and developmental components of this distinction.