Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Queen's University
$33,000.00
Evolutionary modeling of behaviour in sociobiology and psychology
EF 2017-18
Résumé
There are two projects, both evolutionary studies of behaviour. The first belongs to biology and concerns the nature and structure of the theoretical constructs we use in our attempt to understand behaviour of living organisms. The second belongs more to psychology and economics and has both theoretical and experimental components. It uses a new signal version of the much studied ultimatum game to help us understand human behaviour in economic decision making. Project 1 continues my ongoing study of the inclusive fitness (IF) method for analyzing social behaviour. This concerns situations in which the behaviour of an actor affects the fitness of relatives and it has been realized for a long time that selective forces should modify behaviour to take account of such effects. Hamilton (F8) showed that evolution should maximize a simple weighted (by relatedness) sum of these fitness effects. This constructthe IF effectis simple and intuitive (help your neighbours in proportion to their closeness) and under a wide set of assumptions (principally weak selection) its predictions match those of more-detailed genetic models. My past work has been to discuss the predictions of IF models and establish precise equivalence results to other standard measures of fitness such as fixation probability. In this work I have discovered many elegant structural results. These include two general conditions for evolutionary stability; the first applies to all homogeneous population structures (F25) and the second to synergistic (non-additive) fitness effects in both finite and infinite populations (CCV10). It is certainly the case that the IF formulation was crucial to the discovery of these simple conditions. Over the next five years I will continue this work, seeking simple general results, focusing on class-structured populations and non-additive fitness effects. In the ultimatum game of Project 2, player 1 makes an offer to player 2 of how to split an available resource, but that is implemented only if player 2 accepts; otherwise both get nothing. Experiments show that humans play this game much more generously than the Nash equilibrium would predict. In our variation, player 2 makes an up-front demand: I will accept no less than x, which, however, he is not compelled to adhere to. This is analogous to the red patch on a male blackbird wing that appears to signal good paternity but might be dishonest. How is this, possibly empty, demand to affect player 1s offer? It is known from biological studies that such signals of quality do not work unless they exact a cost on the signaler and for this reason we introduce and investigate a cost taken to be proportional to the difference between the demand and the minaccept below which the offer will fail. This project has inspired the interest of my grad students and I will be able to involve them in the model building as well as the field work.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
Tel que publié
Application id
RGPIN-2017-04555
Name nom
Taylor, Peter
Department département
Mathematics and Statistics - Mathematics and Statistics
Organization id
29
Institution établissement
Queen's University
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2017
Competition year année de concours
2017
Award amount
33000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1503
Committee name en
Evolution and Ecology
Committee name fr
Évolution et écologie
Area of application code
1200
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application fr
Avancement des connaissances
Research subject code
4703
Research subject group en
Evolution and ecology
Research subject group fr
Évolution et écologie
Research subject en
Behaviour
Research subject fr
Comportement
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
Evolutionary modeling of behaviour in sociobiology and psychology
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
There are two projects, both evolutionary studies of behaviour. The first belongs to biology and concerns the nature and structure of the theoretical constructs we use in our attempt to understand behaviour of living organisms. The second belongs more to psychology and economics and has both theoretical and experimental components. It uses a new signal version of the much studied ultimatum game to help us understand human behaviour in economic decision making. Project 1 continues my ongoing study of the inclusive fitness (IF) method for analyzing social behaviour. This concerns situations in which the behaviour of an actor affects the fitness of relatives and it has been realized for a long time that selective forces should modify behaviour to take account of such effects. Hamilton (F8) showed that evolution should maximize a simple weighted (by relatedness) sum of these fitness effects. This constructthe IF effectis simple and intuitive (help your neighbours in proportion to their closeness) and under a wide set of assumptions (principally weak selection) its predictions match those of more-detailed genetic models. My past work has been to discuss the predictions of IF models and establish precise equivalence results to other standard measures of fitness such as fixation probability. In this work I have discovered many elegant structural results. These include two general conditions for evolutionary stability; the first applies to all homogeneous population structures (F25) and the second to synergistic (non-additive) fitness effects in both finite and infinite populations (CCV10). It is certainly the case that the IF formulation was crucial to the discovery of these simple conditions. Over the next five years I will continue this work, seeking simple general results, focusing on class-structured populations and non-additive fitness effects. In the ultimatum game of Project 2, player 1 makes an offer to player 2 of how to split an available resource, but that is implemented only if player 2 accepts; otherwise both get nothing. Experiments show that humans play this game much more generously than the Nash equilibrium would predict. In our variation, player 2 makes an up-front demand: I will accept no less than x, which, however, he is not compelled to adhere to. This is analogous to the red patch on a male blackbird wing that appears to signal good paternity but might be dishonest. How is this, possibly empty, demand to affect player 1s offer? It is known from biological studies that such signals of quality do not work unless they exact a cost on the signaler and for this reason we introduce and investigate a cost taken to be proportional to the difference between the demand and the minaccept below which the offer will fail. This project has inspired the interest of my grad students and I will be able to involve them in the model building as well as the field work.