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Grant: Discovery Launch Supplement

The University of British Columbia

$12,500.00

Principled Privacy Analysis of Efficient Searchable Encryption Schemes

EF 2024-25

Résumé
It is estimated that 60% of all corporate data is stored in the cloud. This data is privacy-sensitive (e.g., consider the medical data that a hospital handles), so it must be stored securely, away from the prying eyes of third parties and the cloud provider itself. This is important not only for ethical reasons, for also for legal reasons, as companies must abide by existing regulations such as GDPR, HIPPA, or PIPEDA. However, naively encrypting the data and storing it in the cloud prevents the client from running search queries over it. This search functionality is necessary for the usability of the service, as the client typically just needs to access a specific set of documents at a time (e.g., a hospital accessing the set of patients with a certain medical condition). Searchable encryption is a technology that solves this problem, allowing a client (e.g., a hospital) to store its encrypted data in a cloud storage server, while still being able to fetch particular sets of documents using queries. However, searchable encryption schemes that provide the highest levels of privacy are typically impractical due to their high overheads in terms of bandwidth, computation, or storage. On the other hand, efficient searchable encryption schemes leak some information which can lead to a query recovery attack, where the adversary (e.g., the cloud provider) learns what the client is querying for, and sometimes even contents of the database. This privacy-or-efficiency dilemma is the last barrier that prevents the adoption of searchable encryption schemes. My research program works towards developing tools that allow designing searchable encryption schemes that are both efficiently deployable and privacy-preserving. A defining point of my research is my methodology: instead of purely relying on heuristics or empirical results, my research leverages statistical tools to theoretically study these schemes. Throughout my research career, I have successfully applied various statistical tools to other areas of privacy (8 first-author publications) and showed their potential in a particular searchable encryption scenario (3 recent top-tier security publications). I am thus confident that I can leverage these tools to achieve the following objectives: 1) develop new statistical-based attacks to quantify the privacy of searchable encryption schemes in different adversarial settings, 2) study which lightweight defense techniques work best at providing privacy, and 3) scale these analyses to large dataset sizes that we typically see in realistic settings. I will pursue these objectives over 5 years at UBC, with a group of 2 PhD students and 2 MSc students that I will recruit and train. The long-term goal of my program is to develop a toolbox of robust techniques that researchers can use to design efficient privacy-preserving searchable encryption schemes tailored to different applications and adversarial settings, which will facilitate their adoption.
Programme
Discovery Launch Supplement
Emplacement
British Columbia, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
DGECR-2024-00407
Name nom
Oya Diez, Simon
Department département
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Organization id
2
Institution établissement
The University of British Columbia
Province en
British Columbia
Province fr
Colombie-Britannique
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2024
Competition year année de concours
2024
Award amount
12500
Program id
DGECR
Program name en
Discovery Launch Supplement
Program name fr
Supplément Tremplin vers la découverte
Group en
DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Group fr
RECHERCHE AXÉE SUR LA DÉCOUVERTE
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
800
Area of application group en
Information and communication services
Area of application group fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Area of application en
Information and communication services
Area of application fr
Services d'information et de télécommunications
Research subject code
2711
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Database management
Research subject fr
Gestion de bases de données
Field of research list names en
Not available
Field of research list names fr
Non disponible
Socioeconomic objective list names en
Not available
Socioeconomic objective list names fr
Non disponible
Application title
Principled Privacy Analysis of Efficient Searchable Encryption Schemes
Keywords
database privacy; searchable encryption; privacy-enhancing technologies; privacy attacks; statistical inference; differential privacy; applied cryptography
Application summary
It is estimated that 60% of all corporate data is stored in the cloud. This data is privacy-sensitive (e.g., consider the medical data that a hospital handles), so it must be stored securely, away from the prying eyes of third parties and the cloud provider itself. This is important not only for ethical reasons, for also for legal reasons, as companies must abide by existing regulations such as GDPR, HIPPA, or PIPEDA. However, naively encrypting the data and storing it in the cloud prevents the client from running search queries over it. This search functionality is necessary for the usability of the service, as the client typically just needs to access a specific set of documents at a time (e.g., a hospital accessing the set of patients with a certain medical condition). Searchable encryption is a technology that solves this problem, allowing a client (e.g., a hospital) to store its encrypted data in a cloud storage server, while still being able to fetch particular sets of documents using queries. However, searchable encryption schemes that provide the highest levels of privacy are typically impractical due to their high overheads in terms of bandwidth, computation, or storage. On the other hand, efficient searchable encryption schemes leak some information which can lead to a query recovery attack, where the adversary (e.g., the cloud provider) learns what the client is querying for, and sometimes even contents of the database. This privacy-or-efficiency dilemma is the last barrier that prevents the adoption of searchable encryption schemes. My research program works towards developing tools that allow designing searchable encryption schemes that are both efficiently deployable and privacy-preserving. A defining point of my research is my methodology: instead of purely relying on heuristics or empirical results, my research leverages statistical tools to theoretically study these schemes. Throughout my research career, I have successfully applied various statistical tools to other areas of privacy (8 first-author publications) and showed their potential in a particular searchable encryption scenario (3 recent top-tier security publications). I am thus confident that I can leverage these tools to achieve the following objectives: 1) develop new statistical-based attacks to quantify the privacy of searchable encryption schemes in different adversarial settings, 2) study which lightweight defense techniques work best at providing privacy, and 3) scale these analyses to large dataset sizes that we typically see in realistic settings. I will pursue these objectives over 5 years at UBC, with a group of 2 PhD students and 2 MSc students that I will recruit and train. The long-term goal of my program is to develop a toolbox of robust techniques that researchers can use to design efficient privacy-preserving searchable encryption schemes tailored to different applications and adversarial settings, which will facilitate their adoption.