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Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual

McGill University

$34,000.00

Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks.

EF 2020-21

Résumé
This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Quebec, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data

Tel que publié

Application id
RGPIN-2017-06107
Name nom
Vetta, Adrian
Department département
School of Computer Science, Department of Mathematics and Statistics
Organization id
61
Institution établissement
McGill University
Province en
Québec
Province fr
Québec
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2020
Competition year année de concours
2017
Award amount
34000
Program id
RGPIN
Program name en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
1507
Committee name en
Computer Science
Committee name fr
Sciences informatiques
Area of application code
306
Area of application group en
Energy resources
Area of application group fr
Ressources d'énergie
Area of application en
Energy efficiency
Area of application fr
Efficacité énergétique
Research subject code
2713
Research subject group en
Information technology
Research subject group fr
Technologie de l'information
Research subject en
Algorithms
Research subject fr
Algorithmes
Installment
inst:4-5
Partie
2
Nb partie
5
Application title
Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks.
Keyword
NSERC
Application summary
This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses.