Grant: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
University of Waterloo
$24,500.00
Stategic behaviour in multiagent systems
EF 2008-09
Résumé
We are currently witnessing the growth of a new paradigm of open computing systems, as embodied by the Internet. The heterogeneous participants in these systems (which we call agents) often have diverging information and interests. In particular, in many situations these agents are self-interested and will act to further their own goals, irrespective of the desires of others, nor is it reasonable to assume that a system designer is able to force these agents to behave in some socially optimal way. Interesting applications with these properties range from new electronic marketplaces and auctions, to differentiated scheduling for Internet service provisioning.
The fields of game theory and mechanism design have significantly influenced formal models for self-interested multi-agent systems, by providing a set of tools for addressing coordination problems. However, computational issues have meant that in many interesting settings classic game-theoretic approaches are not robust. For example, classic assumptions made in game theory and mechanism design are that the agents are fully rational, they know which outcomes they prefer, they can easily communicate their preferences and they have infinite computing power. Additionally, in many mechanism-design settings, it is assumed that the mechanism is able to efficiently process large amounts of information and optimally solve complex optimization problems in order to determine the desired outcome. When these assumptions fail to hold, a potentially hazardous gap arises between what the classic approaches predict and what happens in reality. Resolving the conflicts between the game-theoretic and computational constraints, as well as developing appropriate models of the participating agents, are key research challenges which I intend to pursue. A driving application for this research program is the design of electronic marketplaces, however, this research will also provide a foundation for studying and using game-theoretic and approaches in other computer systems.
Programme
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Bénéficiaire
Emplacement
Ontario, Canada
Type de bénéficiaire
Academia
Type
Grant
Source
NSERC's Awards Data
Tel que publié
Application id
312026-2008
Name nom
Larson, Katherine
Department département
Computer Science, School of
Organization id
33
Institution établissement
University of Waterloo
Province en
Ontario
Province fr
Ontario
Country en
CANADA
Country fr
CANADA
Fiscal year exercice financier
2008
Competition year année de concours
2008
Award amount
24500
Program id
RGPIN
Program nane en
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
Program name fr
Programme de subventions à la découverte - individuelles
Group en
Discovery grants programs
Group fr
Programmes de subventions à la découverte
Committee code
331
Committee name en
Computing and Information Sciences - B
Committee name fr
Informatique - B
Area of application code
1207
Area of application group en
Advancement of knowledge
Area of application group fr
Avancement des connaissances
Area of application en
Information, computer and communication technologies
Area of application fr
Technologie de l'information, des ordinateurs et des réseaux de communications
Research subject code
2800
Research subject group en
Artificial intelligence
Research subject group fr
Intelligence artificielle
Research subject en
Artificial intelligence (computer vision, use2603)
Research subject fr
Intelligence artificielle (vision artificielle, utiliser 2603)
Partie
1
Nb partie
5
Application title
Stategic behaviour in multiagent systems
Keyword
NA
Application summary
We are currently witnessing the growth of a new paradigm of open computing systems, as embodied by the Internet. The heterogeneous participants in these systems (which we call agents) often have diverging information and interests. In particular, in many situations these agents are self-interested and will act to further their own goals, irrespective of the desires of others, nor is it reasonable to assume that a system designer is able to force these agents to behave in some socially optimal way. Interesting applications with these properties range from new electronic marketplaces and auctions, to differentiated scheduling for Internet service provisioning.
The fields of game theory and mechanism design have significantly influenced formal models for self-interested multi-agent systems, by providing a set of tools for addressing coordination problems. However, computational issues have meant that in many interesting settings classic game-theoretic approaches are not robust. For example, classic assumptions made in game theory and mechanism design are that the agents are fully rational, they know which outcomes they prefer, they can easily communicate their preferences and they have infinite computing power. Additionally, in many mechanism-design settings, it is assumed that the mechanism is able to efficiently process large amounts of information and optimally solve complex optimization problems in order to determine the desired outcome. When these assumptions fail to hold, a potentially hazardous gap arises between what the classic approaches predict and what happens in reality. Resolving the conflicts between the game-theoretic and computational constraints, as well as developing appropriate models of the participating agents, are key research challenges which I intend to pursue. A driving application for this research program is the design of electronic marketplaces, however, this research will also provide a foundation for studying and using game-theoretic and approaches in other computer systems.