Program directory · National Defence
Ready Naval Forces
- Department
- National Defence
- Program code
- BUO02 (ND)
- Core responsibility
- Ready Forces
- In Departmental Plans
- 2018-19 – 2026-27 · New since an earlier plan
What it does
The Ready Naval Forces program generates, sustains and renews combat effective, multi-purpose naval forces and capabilities that are ready for operations. The program is deliberately organized to ensure that the Royal Canadian Navy is trained and adequately equipped for a scalable, agile, responsive and interoperable force both domestically with civil authorities and other Government Departments, and internationally with allies and partners.
Source: the department's Program Inventory, via GC InfoBase.
History and lineage
First appears in GC InfoBase's actual spending by program in 2018-19. The data does not record when a program was created; it may be older than its first appearance here, which is limited by the sources (program spending starts in 2010-11, Departmental Plans in 2018-19).
| Program | Relation | Years with data | Actual spending over those years |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ready Naval Forces | This program | 2018-19 – 2028-29 | $9.96B |
No earlier or later program in the same department has a similar name.
Significant changes in scope and budget
Detected from the data: renames between plans, programs it appears to replace, merge with or split into (matched by name), year-over-year changes in spending of at least 25% and $5M, or in employees of at least 20% and 25 FTEs, linked budget measures, and results indicators added or dropped.
| Year | What changed | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2022-23 | Indicators added: % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations; % of Maritime key fleets that are in a condition enabling their employment for Naval Operations (DND/CAF) | Departmental Results Framework (GC InfoBase) |
| 2022-23 | Indicators dropped: % of Maritime key fleets are serviceable in accordance with the defined readiness requirement | Departmental Results Framework (GC InfoBase) |
| 2023-24 | Indicators dropped: % of Maritime key fleets that are in a condition enabling their employment for Naval Operations (DND/CAF) | Departmental Results Framework (GC InfoBase) |
| 2024-25 | Indicators added: % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements | Departmental Results Framework (GC InfoBase) |
| 2024-25 | Indicators dropped: % of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations | Departmental Results Framework (GC InfoBase) |
Success criteria
The program's indicators from its department's Departmental Results Framework: the target set in each year's plan, and the result reported the following year. Source: GC InfoBase.
Historical: targets against results
% of Force Posture & Readiness days achieved during a given Fiscal Year (Unit Ready Days)
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | ≥ 100% | 2019 | 90% The reduction unit ready days was primarily influenced by the Victoria class’ ongoing Transitional Docking Work Periods. | Not met |
| 2019-20 | ≥ 90% | 2020 | 83% The Victoria Class submarine fleet serviceability for training and readiness have been primarily influenced by the ongoing Transitional Docking Work Periods. Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel delivery delays have resulted in the class being unable to meet planned readiness objectives that were originally expected in the final quarter of FY 2019-20. | Not met |
| 2020-21 | ≥ 90% | 2021 | 88.3% The Unit Ready Days figure demonstrates how well the classes of ships meet Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R). Despite COVID-19 challenges, there was a significant improvement from the previous Fiscal Year due to the planned use of additional ships to support a higher rate of Personnel Force Generation. The Victoria class Unit Ready Days were primarily influenced by the ongoing Transitional Docki… | Not met |
| 2021-22 | ≥ 90% | 2022 | 98.3% | Met |
| 2022-23 | ≥ 90% | 2023 | 76.6% The RCN was able to achieve its planned Unit Ready Days through FY22/23 for the two largest classes of surface vessels, but suffered losses of Unit Ready Days in both the SSK and AOPV fleets. These can be attributed to ongoing maintenance challenges with the SSKs, including damage experienced in HMCS Windsor in January 2023, as well as issues with the AOPVs. Through summer 2022, an issue was iden… | Not met |
| 2023-24 | ≥ 90% | 2024 | 68.7% In FY 2023-24, the RCN did not meet its FP&R targets due to several technical challenges affecting fleet readiness. For the Halifax-class frigates, deployment delays resulting from critical engineering repairs impacted achieving FP&R commitments in the first quarter. The Victoria-class submarines faced reduced readiness due to an extended reactivation timeline for one submarine and critical repai… | Not met |
| 2024-25 | ≥ 90% | 2025 | 91.2% | Met |
% of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-25 | ≥ 60% | 2025 | 59.6% The target was not met due to the low serviceability of key fleets in the first two quarters due to the following reasons: an extended work period for the Halifax class; crewing and materiel issues for the Kingston class; and, mechanical issues on HMCS Windsor. Performance improved in the last two quarters, and targets were met during that period. The 59.6% result is assessed against a target of… | Not met |
% of Royal Canadian Navy Fleet Maintenance Facility (FMF) positions filled (FMF Establishment Staffing Rate)
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | ≥ 95% | 2019 | 90.9% Fleet Maintenance Facilities experienced challenges in growing the workforce to target levels. Despite increased recruiting and staffing efforts, workforce attrition slowed overall growth. | Not met |
| 2019-20 | ≥ 95% | 2020 | 87.9% While civilian attrition has contributed to slowed FMF growth, the FMFs have not received adequate funding to enable staffing to their full civilian establishment level (with approximately only 90% of the establishment funded). Changes in operational tempo (i.e. increase to number of High Readiness Ships) and/or changes in service delivery offerings has not yet resulted in adjustments to the FMF… | Not met |
| 2020-21 | ≥ 95% | 2021 | 74% Both Fleet Maintenance Facilities (FMFs) remain below the Navy’s target staffing levels, primarily due to Salary Wage Envelope (SWE) constraints. FMFCB was approaching its SWE-limited staffing levels, whereas FMFCS was having to attrite slightly in order to properly fit within its SWE envelope. The current SWE allocation across both FMFs was not sufficient to achieve the minimum workforce levels… | Not met |
| 2021-22 | ≥ 95% | 2022 | 96.2% | Met |
| 2022-23 | ≥ 95% | 2023 | 95.6% | Met |
| 2023-24 | ≥ 95% | 2024 | 99.5% | Met |
| 2024-25 | ≥ 95% | 2025 | 95.5% | Met |
% of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training and readiness requirements in support of concurrent operations
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-23 | ≥ 90% | 2023 | 87% The two classes of vessels which most impacted serviceability through this reporting period were the Victoria-class submarines (VCS) and the Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPVs). Most of the submarines continued on extended maintenance with the contracted support company through the year, HMCS Windsor (WSR) was serviceable for most of the year. WSR, however, suffered mechanic… | Not met |
| 2023-24 | ≥ 90% | 2024 | 45.7% During FY 2023-24, the Royal Canadian Navy did not meet its serviceability targets due to aging fleets, the introduction of new platforms, and crew availability. Halifax-class frigates experienced longer docking work periods and post-docking reactivations, primarily attributable to the age of the class. The Kingston-class ships met serviceability goals for the first three quarters, however, fell… | Not met |
% of Maritime key fleets that are in a condition enabling their employment for Naval Operations (DND/CAF)
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-23 | Target to be determined | 2023 | 51.2 % The RCN was able to achieve its targeted serviceability through FY22/23 for the two largest classes of surface vessels, but suffered serviceability impacts in both the SSK and AOPV fleets. These can be attributed to ongoing maintenance challenges with the SSKs, including damage experienced in HMCS Windsor in January 2023, as well as issues with the AOPVs. Through summer 2022, an issue was identif… | Not met |
% of Maritime key fleets are serviceable in accordance with the defined readiness requirement
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | ≥ 95% | 2019 | 98.4% | Met |
| 2019-20 | ≥ 90% | 2020 | 83% The Victoria Class fleet serviceability for training and readiness have been primarily influenced by the ongoing Transitional Docking Work Periods. Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel delivery delays have resulted in the class being unable to meet planned readiness objectives that were originally expected in the final quarter of FY 2019-20. | Not met |
| 2020-21 | ≥ 90% | 2021 | 84.9% Unforeseen COVID-19 impacts during the year, particularly during the first quarter, represent the majority of the reduction to Sea Days. | Not met |
| 2021-22 | ≥ 90% | 2022 | 89.1% The performance result was affected by a significant engineering issue for Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Toronto coupled with a fire in HMCS Fredericton. Despite their impact on serviceability rates for FY 2021-22, the engineering issue in HMCS Toronto has been resolved, and initial repairs to HMCS Fredericton have been completed such that it is ready to continue support naval operations, as… | Not met |
Current: the 2026-27 plan's targets
% of Royal Canadian Navy Fleet Maintenance Facility (FMF) positions filled (FMF Establishment Staffing Rate)
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-27 | ≥ 95% | 2027 | — | Planned |
Future goals: targets due after 2026-27
% of Force Posture & Readiness days achieved during a given Fiscal Year (Unit Ready Days)
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-27 | ≥ 90% | 2032 | — | Planned |
% of maritime key fleets that are serviceable to meet training, readiness, and operational requirements
Expected result: Maritime force elements are deployable in support of Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R)
Bars: result reported. Dashed line: target.
| Report year | Target | Due | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-27 | ≥ 75% | 2036 | — | Planned |
Spending and employees: planned against actual
Spending
Show the numbers
| Fiscal year | Planned | Actual |
|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | $1.13B | $1.3B |
| 2019-20 | $1.31B | $1.31B |
| 2020-21 | $1.25B | $1.46B |
| 2021-22 | $1.09B | $1.32B |
| 2022-23 | $1.35B | $1.48B |
| 2023-24 | $1.24B | $1.73B |
| 2024-25 | $1.4B | $1.36B |
| 2025-26 | $1.33B | — |
| 2026-27 | $1.56B | — |
| 2027-28 | $1.56B* | — |
| 2028-29 | $1.49B* | — |
Employees (FTEs)
Show the numbers
| Fiscal year | Planned | Actual |
|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 | 7,973 | 8,919 |
| 2019-20 | 9,158 | 8,113 |
| 2020-21 | 8,178 | 8,294 |
| 2021-22 | 6,796 | 9,480 |
| 2022-23 | 9,666 | 8,331 |
| 2023-24 | 8,798 | 8,728 |
| 2024-25 | 8,499 | 8,182 |
| 2025-26 | 8,236 | — |
| 2026-27 | 8,552 | — |
| 2027-28 | 8,656* | — |
| 2028-29 | 8,731* | — |
Planned spending, plan by plan
Each row is one year's Departmental Plan and its forecast for the next three fiscal years; read a column down to see how the forecast for one year changed. The last row is what was actually spent. Click an amount for its source. Biggest changes in federal spending plans
| Plan | 2018-19 | 2019-20 | 2020-21 | 2021-22 | 2022-23 | 2023-24 | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-19 plan | $1,131,279,678 | $1,140,494,405 | $1,145,775,671 | ||||||||
| 2019-20 plan | $1,306,221,420 | $1,323,955,101 | $1,351,066,622 | ||||||||
| 2020-21 plan | $1,251,644,366 | $1,246,372,809 | $1,218,971,034 | ||||||||
| 2021-22 plan | $1,094,911,087 | $1,050,660,028 | $973,612,823 | ||||||||
| 2022-23 plan | $1,345,510,679 | $1,195,001,662 | $1,204,156,908 | ||||||||
| 2023-24 plan | $1,238,879,791 | $1,231,262,341 | $1,132,082,523 | ||||||||
| 2024-25 plan | $1,403,385,727 | $1,279,167,142 | $1,280,351,742 | ||||||||
| 2025-26 plan | $1,327,436,938 | $1,335,227,754 | $1,339,102,047 | ||||||||
| 2026-27 plan | $1,561,827,499 | $1,555,303,999 | $1,488,482,999 | ||||||||
| Actual | $1,301,026,782 | $1,307,190,917 | $1,459,744,421 | $1,316,594,518 | $1,484,532,095 | $1,728,619,478 | $1,362,743,205 |
Actual spending is from Departmental Results Reports and the Public Accounts, as published in GC InfoBase. FTEs are full-time equivalents.
